

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER 1962

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1962

| | | |
|--|---------------------------|-----|
| SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA: A REAPPRAISAL | <i>Ivar Spector</i> | 257 |
| PAKISTAN'S MOOD: THE NEW REALISM | <i>Norman D. Palmer</i> | 263 |
| INDONESIA: "THE YEAR OF TRIUMPH" | <i>Ewa T. Pauker</i> | 272 |
| PLAN FOR MALAYSIAN FEDERATION | <i>Gerald P. Dartford</i> | 278 |
| GROWING PAINS OF A CHANGING JAPAN | <i>Paul F. Langer</i> | 283 |
| THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA | <i>J. Chal Vinson</i> | 290 |
| SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE WEST AT BAY | <i>Bernard B. Fall</i> | 295 |

REGULAR FEATURES

| | |
|---|-----|
| BOOK REVIEWS | 302 |
| CURRENT DOCUMENTS: <i>The Future of West New Guinea</i> | 303 |
| <i>Integration in the University of Mississippi</i> . | 307 |
| THE MONTH IN REVIEW | 314 |

FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

CURRENT *History*

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY
The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY
Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:
D. G. Redmond

NOVEMBER, 1962
VOLUME 43 NUMBER 255

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN B. ANTELL

Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors
ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

Book Review Editor:
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

Coming Next Month

December, 1962

AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA

Our December issue focuses on several important countries of Africa. Next month seven specialists discuss economic and political problems facing the new states. Articles include:

The Congo Republic

by HARRY RUDIN, Professor of History, Yale University, and author of "Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914";

Nigeria

by ARNOLD RIVKIN, Director of the African Economic and Political Development Project, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and author of "Africa and the West: Elements of Free-World Policy";

Ghana

by ADHEMAR BYL, Research Assistant, African Language and Area Center, Michigan State University;

Republic of South Africa

by COLIN RHYS LOVELL, Professor of History, University of Southern California;

Nations of French Speaking Africa

by CARROLL QUIGLEY, Professor of History, Georgetown University, and author of "The Evolution of Civilization";

East Africa in Transition

by LEONARD S. KENWORTHY, Department of Education, Brooklyn College, and author of "Leaders of New Nations";

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

by KEITH IRVINE, formerly editor of "African Weekly" and "Africa Today."

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1962, by Current History, Inc.

85 cents a copy • \$7.50 a year • Canada \$7.75 a year • Foreign including the Philippines, \$8.25 a year
Please see inside back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

CURRENT History

NOVEMBER, 1962

VOL. 43, NO. 255

In the Far East, "one of the main purposes of the Soviet aid program is to create industrial proletarian and professional classes with a pro-Soviet and anti-Western bias that will be completely independent of the Western world." "A reappraisal of Soviet policy in the Orient for the past two years indicates that it envisages the complete withdrawal of the West from Asia, physically, economically, intellectually and spiritually."

Soviet Policy in Asia: A Reappraisal

By IVAR SPECTOR

Associate Professor of Russian Civilization, University of Washington

ON DECEMBER 5, 1917, within a month of seizing power, the Bolsheviks issued a highly significant "Appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East."¹ This "Appeal" amounted to a definition of the Soviet Revolution and its purpose vis-à-vis Asia, namely, the liberation of the Orient. About five years later, the scope of the term "Orient" was appreciably broadened to include the entire colonial world of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Ever since the Revolution, the Soviet government has emphasized to articulate Asians that their liberation depended on the existence of a strong U.S.S.R. with the proviso that there could be no powerful and influential U.S.S.R. without the support of the Orient, especially of Asian countries adjacent to the Soviet Union. It likewise differentiated between the "October Revolution" (1917) and other modern revolutions, concerned primarily with the political and social struc-

tures of Europe and America. The main concern of the Bolshevik Revolution was the Orient.

In the 1920's, the Soviets outlined three stages for the liberation of each nation of the Orient: 1. The elimination of the colonial (imperialist) power. 2. Undermining of the new nationalist regime that superseded it, comprised mainly of upper and middle class members, with which local Communists were expected to collaborate temporarily. 3. Establishment of a Communist regime. To achieve this program, the Soviets expected to use the support of Asian nationalist movements. Even today in Asia they profess the principles of the Russian Revolution of 1905 to achieve a 1917 objective. In Indonesia, the U.S.S.R. has backed Sukarno's unsuccessful efforts for a NASAKOM, or coalition government, comprised of nationalists, the Islamic element and Communists. Another example is the coalition government in Laos.

Since World War II, with the voluntary or forced withdrawal of the colonial powers from most of Asia and Africa, the first plank

¹ For the complete text, see Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958* (1959), pp. 33-35.

of the Soviet program has been largely realized, although Khrushchev claims the danger of "collective colonialism" has replaced that of individual empires. In the fulfillment of the second stage, however, the Soviets have struck a snag. The new nationalist governments of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, some of which have proclaimed themselves Socialist, have refused to become transitional Kerensky regimes. Not content with political revolution, they have instituted economic and social reforms, thereby taking the wind from Communist sails.

Though the West objected to some of the social reforms of the new nations, they have proved to be a strong deterrent to communism. Interviewed by a Soviet delegation in Cairo (*Pravda*, July 19, 1962), Nasser explained the two basic differences between Arab and Soviet socialism: 1. Arab socialism is based, not on dictatorship (proletarian), but on the attainment of socialism by peaceful means. 2. Islam is the religion of socialism. In Indonesia, the state philosophy, Pantjasila, likewise calls for belief in God. For the time being, the U.S.S.R. has to tolerate divergent concepts of the Socialist state and philosophy in Red China, Indonesia and the U.A.R.

The Soviet explanation for failure thus far to achieve the second stage of the Communist program is that the emerging nations lack strong proletariats. A revealing article in *Kommunist* (No. 6, April, 1962), on "The Rise of the Labor Movement in the Countries of Asia and Africa," prepared by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, promises that this situation will soon be changed. Since 1955, the Soviet aid and trade drive in Asia and Africa has been directed toward industrialization, with the object of creating proletariats where none exist and strengthening weak proletariats.²

Today, in the non-Communist countries of Asia and Africa, there are said to be around 100,000,000 hired laborers, half of them

in the three great Asian countries of Indonesia, India, and Japan. This article also lists 4,000,000 in the Philippines, 2,500,000 in the U.A.R., 2,00,000 in Turkey, 1,500,000 in Iran, and 1,000,000 in Pakistan. Already, it claims, these industrial proletariats are under the leadership of their Communist parties. The consistency with which the U.S.S.R. promotes the oil industry in such countries as Syria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, and so forth, may be due to its significance in the creation of proletariats in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Soviet construction of oil refineries also paves the way for Soviet exports of crude oil, at the expense of the capitalist oil interests of the Middle East. Ceylon's recent switch to Soviet and Rumanian crude oil is expected to set a pattern for other emerging nations. A more extensive program is under way in India (*Pravda*, August 15, 1962).

RED CHINA

One of the main sources of dispute between Red China and the U.S.S.R. has been Chinese pressure for territorial aggrandizement in Asia. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, wished to demonstrate to the West that with the retreat of the colonial powers, Asian problems could be settled peacefully. At the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev stated: "The Soviet Union wishes to live in peace and friendship even with such neighbors as Iran, Pakistan, and Japan," which are tied to Western-sponsored blocs. The Soviet purpose was to transform Asia into a *Zona Mira* (Zone of Peace). Its outstanding pillars, in addition to the U.S.S.R., were to be Red China and India, which together would insure the peace of Asia.

Today the Soviets claim that over 40 "neutral" countries support the Socialist bloc's policy of peaceful coexistence and comprise a more extensive Peace Zone. Local conflicts to liquidate colonialism, as in South Vietnam or West Irian, are not at variance with the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence."

In line with this policy, the Red Chinese appear to have arranged an amicable and

² See this writer's article, "Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism," *Current History*, November, 1959, pp. 272-77.

advantageous settlement of their border disputes with Burma and Nepal. Their refusal to recognize the McMahon Line between Tibet and India, however, increasingly threatened Soviet objectives for *Zona Mira*. A situation was created in which the U.S.S.R., a Socialist state, offered India, a capitalist regime, economic and military aid against her Communist ally, Red China. Likewise, Red China supported the anti-Communist state of Pakistan against India in the Kashmir dispute, while the U.S.S.R. vetoed a Western move in the United Nations Security Council (June 21, 1962) to force India to negotiate this 14-year-old territorial issue.

In this day and age, when there is a strong movement on foot in Western Europe to subordinate nationalism to Europeanism and even to promote the interdependence of Europe and America in an Atlantic Union, nationalism in Asia takes precedence over internationalism. In a Moscow speech (*Pravda*, June 11, 1961), President Sukarno of Indonesia reminded Soviet leaders that what is going on in Asia and Africa is national, not international or world, revolution, and that a recognition of this fact is basic to an understanding of the peoples of these continents. This rising nationalist tide in Asia has made its peoples more territory-conscious than ever before. Protesting Anglo-American opposition to India's stand on Kashmir (June 22, 1962), Prime Minister Nehru made this abundantly clear in his emotionally charged statement: "Kashmir is flesh of our flesh and bone of our bones."

Of late there have been some indications of a rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and Red China on Asian policies. On July 23, 1962, both signed the Geneva Declaration and Protocol guaranteeing the neutrality and independence of Laos.³ Two weeks later, on August 6, possibly under Soviet pressure, Mao Tse-tung agreed to India's request for the resumption of negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the Ladakh border dispute in Kashmir on the basis of a 1960 report largely favorable to India. There appears

to be continued collaboration on the Sino-Soviet border in connection with the Amur and Sungari power and transport projects.

SOVIET AID PROGRAM

In the post-Stalin era, the Russians have concentrated, not on territorial annexations, but on winning over the peoples of the emerging nations, especially their intellectuals. Since 1955, the Soviet bloc has spent over \$6.5 billion in economic and military aid, almost 80 per cent of which has gone to Asian nations on or near the periphery of the Communist orbit: Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, India and, farther afield, Indonesia. The U.S.S.R. itself has 23 economic cooperative agreements with the developing nations, involving 480 diverse projects. One of the main purposes of the Soviet aid program is to create industrial proletarian and professional classes with a pro-Soviet and anti-Western bias that will be completely independent of the Western world.

To win the intellectuals, the Soviets have opened their doors wide to Asian and African students and professional personnel, have expanded Friendship University in Moscow as a special training ground for them, and have provided access to Soviet periodicals, both scholarly, as, for instance, *Narody Azii i Afriki* (*The Peoples of Asia and Africa*) and semi-popular, *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (*Asia and Africa Today*), to provide a forum for their views. On the honorarium for a scholarly article published in a Soviet periodical, an Asian scholar is reported to be able to live comfortably for a year. As one indication of its success, the Indian-Soviet Cultural Society, founded in Bombay in 1952, a decade later had established 132 branches in various states, regions, and cities of India.

Taking advantage of the intense nationalism of the new Asian intellectuals, Soviet cultural leaders have encouraged them to follow the Soviet example by rewriting their own past from an Asian rather than a Western standpoint, and reinterpreting the history of the Western world in their own image. Every Soviet periodical devoted to Asia and Africa includes lists of new Soviet works on

³ For the text, see *Current History*, Oct. 1962, p. 234ff.

the emerging nations, anti-Western in approach, which re-emphasize not only the evil influence of the West in the Orient, but also the intellectual debt of the West to the East. These works help to set the tone for the new Asian histories.

When the Soviet foreign aid drive was first launched, the major Soviet target was the Middle East, especially the Arab World. This area still figures prominently in the Soviet program. But since 1960 the major emphasis of the Soviet foreign aid program appears to have shifted to the Far East and South Asia, especially, to Red China's distress, to the heavily-populated non-Communist states of Indonesia and India, and, more recently, to Japan.

NEW PRIORITIES

Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia, for various reasons, has become a prime target of the Soviet aid and trade program. Indonesia's campaign for the further liquidation of colonialism by annexation of West Irian from the Netherlands has received strong moral and material Soviet support. As a major Muslim state (population nearing 100,000,000), Indonesia offsets Pakistan, which is tied to the Western-sponsored Cento and Seato blocs, and also the Philippines, oriented toward the United States. Although Indonesia was the first Muslim state to meet and win the challenge of communism in Civil War (1958-1961), today its Communist party, over two million strong, is the largest and best disciplined outside the Soviet orbit, and is reputed to be one of the two most important forces backing the Sukarno regime, the other being the officer corps.⁴ The objective of the Government's Eight-Year-Plan (1961-1969), approved December 3, 1960, is to transform Indonesia from a basically agrarian into an industrial nation. The Plan clearly indicated that the Indonesian economy would be based largely

on state rather than on private enterprise, a purposeful drift toward socialism or state capitalism welcomed by the U.S.S.R.

Soviet credits, it is estimated, cover from 15 per cent to 20 per cent of Indonesian investments in the Eight-Year-Plan. The Soviet-Indonesian Agreement for Economic and Technical Collaboration, February 28, 1960, provided \$250 million for economic aid, most of it for industrial enterprises, including metallurgical plants in Kalimantan (Borneo) and Java, and the great Asahan industrial complex in Sumatra. The largest stadium in Asia, built at Sukarno's request to accommodate 100,000 persons and modelled after the Lenin Stadium in Moscow, was opened in Djakarta, July 21, 1962, just in time for the Fourth Asian Games in August.

In the area of military aid, in which the United States was handicapped by friendly relations with the Netherlands, Soviet achievement has been even more spectacular. MIG-15 fighter planes, piloted by Indonesians trained in the U.A.R. and Czechoslovakia, made their appearance in Indonesia in 1958. It is estimated that well over \$750 million of Soviet bloc military aid, fully one-third of that allocated to "neutral" nations, has gone to Indonesia to promote the liberation of West Irian.⁵ This up-to-date military equipment included MIG-21 fighter planes armed with missiles, TV-16 medium bombers, amphibious tanks and artillery, as well as submarines and cruisers. Large numbers of Soviet instructors have been assigned to ground, air and sea forces.

The Dutch-Indonesian agreement for Indonesian occupation of West Irian by May, 1963, arranged through the good offices of the United States, and signed at the United Nations, August 15, 1962,⁶ may have rendered this military buildup superfluous. It has not removed the danger of Indonesian military dependence on the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union reaped much of the credit for the settlement on the ground that no peaceful solution was possible without strong Soviet backing and military aid.

India. Although Nehru's India, which preserves close ties with the West, especially with

⁴ See Guy G. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1962, pp. 612-26.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ For the text of this agreement, see pages 308ff. of this issue.

the British Commonwealth and the United States, was slow to respond to Soviet overtures for extended economic and cultural relations, the success of the Bhilai steel plant, which went into full operation in January, 1961, and the scrupulous behavior of Soviet experts training Indian workers, have encouraged a marked expansion in Soviet-Indian trade. Soviet leaders are impressed by the rapid rise of the Indian proletariat, and hope for a friendly Indian "Socialist" regime in the future. In the elections of February, 1962, Indian Communists, with 11,473,384 votes, won 30 seats in Parliament. An informative article by P. Kutsobin in *Pravda* (August 4, 1962) complained, however, that right-wing Socialists in both India and Indonesia are the diehard core of anti-communism, and efforts must be made to win them over.

Soviet aims have been advanced by consistent Soviet support of India's claims to Kashmir and commendation of her contribution to the liquidation of colonialism through the forcible annexation of Portuguese Goa, Damao and Diu, in December, 1961. This was in sharp contrast to British and American criticism of Indian action in both instances. Fear of Red China, uncertainty about the amount and continuation of American aid (especially since the United States Senate's attempted 25 per cent cut in 1962) and about India's relationship to the European Common Market in the event of British membership, have no doubt contributed to the Nehru Government's interest in closer relations with the U.S.S.R. From the Soviet standpoint, India serves as a counterweight to Communist China, now and for the future.

Soviet loans to India since 1955, amounting to more than \$800,000,000, fail to approach the \$4,000,000,000 advanced by the United States. Soviet aid, however, has been directed toward large state-owned industrial enterprises, such as the Bhilai steel mill, three hydro-electric stations, the heavy machine-building complex at Ranchi (scheduled for completion in 1964), and two oil refineries, all of which demonstrate the progress of Indian industrialization. In June, 1962, the

U.S.S.R. agreed to supply engines for supersonic transport aircraft under construction in India on a British model.

The decision of the Nehru government in July, 1962, to negotiate for the purchase of two squadrons of Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter planes, and for the manufacture of this plane in India, marked a new trend in Soviet military aid to the Nehru regime, which earlier rejected American military assistance and a plane deal with Britain. The Indian government resented British and American protests when these negotiations were announced as unwarranted interference in India's domestic affairs, especially in view of United States military aid to Pakistan. Heretofore, Soviet military aid has gone mainly to the U.A.R., Indonesia and Iraq.

Taking advantage of the favorable climate of official Indian opinion, Anastas I. Mikoyan, Soviet deputy premier, cut short his visit to Indonesia in July, 1962, to enter into broad discussions with Nehru for still greater economic collaboration, which would demonstrate to the world "the peaceful coexistence of two countries with divergent social structures." Mikoyan's plea for time to plan such large-scale aid and the subsequent Soviet announcement of delay in the delivery of electrical generators already pledged for India's Third Five-Year Plan suggest the overextension of Soviet commitments, which even the Comecon (Soviet version of the Common Market) cannot solve.

Japan. The U.S.S.R., in search of new sources of industrial equipment to supplement shortages at home, turned to industrialized Japan in the summer of 1962. The first long-term trade agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union was concluded in March, 1960, by the Japanese Sea, a private company representing firms interested in Japan-U.S.S.R. trade. Within two years the trade volume is said to have reached \$225,000,000, exceeding expectations. Progress with Japan has been slow, partly because of official distrust of Soviet motives and apprehension about endangering the Japanese-American alliance.

Now that the Japanese have neared the

saturation point in Western markets and were jolted by the 1962 slump on the New York Stock Exchange, the Khrushchev government has dangled before them the irresistible bait of a vast Siberian market, which might increase the trade turnover to \$1,000,000,000 within a few years. With Soviet plans for the industrialization of Siberia and the Soviet Far East lagging behind Soviet goals, Khrushchev and Mikoyan proposed to Agriculture Minister Kono (now Minister of Construction in the Ikeda Cabinet) in the early summer of 1962 the possibility of using Japanese production to accelerate development there.

For the Soviets, an industrialized and populated Siberia would serve as a "cushion" in the event of conflict. From a long-range viewpoint, the contemplated economic collaboration might be regarded as a Soviet-Japanese insurance policy against Red Chinese aggression. As in other Asian countries, one Russian object is to reduce Japanese dependence on the West, in this case on the United States. The Russians have taken precautions to emphasize that this is no Far Eastern Rapallo Treaty, by means of which the Japanese would develop munitions factories in Siberia and train Japanese forces there.

Kono recognized the vast ideological gulf that separates Japan from the Communist orbit. Nonetheless, on August 8, 1962, a high-level Japanese trade mission to Moscow was led by Yoshinari Kawai, president of the important machinery producer, the Komatsu Manufacturing Company. Kawai's delegation of about 60, including bankers and representatives of the machine construction, shipbuilding, and synthetic fibers industries, was ostensibly a private, not a government venture. It had the backing of top Japanese business interests, who felt that they must assume the initiative to end economic depression and unemployment, especially in the oil and steel industries, thereby helping to preserve capitalism at home. The recent success of Japanese private industry in establishing trade relations with Red China, which has led to government moves to expand that

trade, may set a precedent for dealings with the U.S.S.R.

DEWESTERNIZATION OF THE ORIENT

A reappraisal of Soviet policy in the Orient for the past two years indicates that it envisages the complete withdrawal of the West from Asia, physically, economically, intellectually and spiritually. According to the Soviets, it was the colonial Orient that gave strength and power to the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese empires. Therefore, without Asia (and presumably Africa), Europe will vegetate and decay. What the U.S.S.R. has accomplished in 40 years, Asians are assured they can do in less time with Soviet help. By advancing economic, technical, scientific and military assistance to Asian nations, even at the expense of the vast needs of the Soviet peoples, Khrushchev seeks to demonstrate that everything Asians require for liberation and development is very readily available to them from the Soviet bloc.

Perhaps the most dramatic symbol of the Soviet focus on the Orient in recent years was the naming of the first Soviet sputnik to orbit the earth, the *Vostok* (Orient, East). As additional experiments in manned space flights have occurred, Soviet space ships have been listed, *Vostok I* to *Vostok IV*. In a revealing cartoon, "Light from the *Vostok*" (East), the Soviet humor magazine, *Krokodil* (April 20, 1961) depicted the shepherds of Palestine watching, not the Star of Bethlehem, but the Soviet spaceship.

In other words, the Soviet objective is the complete dewesternization of Asia and its reorientation toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Ivar Spector is the author of *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture* (3rd edition, 1961). His latest work, *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia*, was published in 1962. Professor Spector teaches courses in Russian Civilization and Soviet-Muslim relations at the University of Washington.

Discussing the challenges which the new Pakistani government must face on the domestic and international levels, this specialist observes that "At the present time Pakistan seems to be in what may be described as a mood of 'new realism' in its foreign as well as in its domestic affairs. This mood has been created by its many disappointments and frustrations, at home and abroad."

Pakistan's Mood: The New Realism

By NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

ON AUGUST 14, 1962, Pakistan completed a decade and a half of independent existence. It has embarked on "a new phase" of its "national life and activity," proclaimed on June 8 by President Mohammad Ayub Khan in an address before the inaugural session of the newly-elected National Assembly of Pakistan. On that date martial law, which had been in force ever since the "revolution" of October, 1958, officially came to an end, and the new Constitution, made public on March 1, entered into effect.

Under controlled conditions, Pakistan is being given another chance to develop representative institutions and to broaden the base of its political life. Politically, the great question is whether it will succeed in "blending democracy with discipline," to use Ayub Khan's words, and thus escape the grim alternatives of strict authoritarianism or chaos. Economically, the main task is to concentrate as much as possible on economic development, and thereby to lay the basis for a more tolerable life for its approximately 95 million people. Diplomatically, the central effort must be directed to the achievement of national security and national objectives. These include the improvement of relations with India and Afghanistan, a reassessment of its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the

Communist states, notably the Soviet Union and China, on the other, and the development of a more active and influential role in world affairs generally. Broadly speaking, Pakistan must strive for development, integrity, security and recognition.

Pakistan has experienced many vicissitudes and setbacks during its brief period of independence. Its survival is a kind of minor miracle. Unfortunately it lost its great leader, the Quaid-i-Azum, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, only 13 months after independence, and his chief lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated three years later. Between 1951 and 1958, the real interests of the country were too often subordinated to a struggle for power among competing parties, groups and individuals. Two of the Governors-General, Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, were strong men, and at least one Prime Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy, was an able and clever politician. On the whole, however, there is justice in the conclusion of the Constitution Commission, which submitted its report to President Ayub Khan in 1961, that "the real causes of the failure of the parliamentary form of government in Pakistan were mainly the lack of leadership resulting in lack of well-organised and disciplined parties, the general lack of character in the politicians and their undue interference in the administration."

In early October, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza, who had also served as Governor-General of Pakistan, alarmed at the deteriorating state of affairs in the country, suspended the Constitution of 1956, dismissed the National Assembly, abolished political parties, and proclaimed martial law. On October 8, General Ayub Khan, who soon forced General Mirza to turn over supreme power and to leave Pakistan, declared in a broadcast over Radio Pakistan:

Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand and work. When the time comes your opinion will be freely asked. But when that will be, events alone can tell. Meanwhile, we have to put this mess right and put the country on an even keel.

For three years and eight months Pakistan remained under martial law. This was virtually a political vacuum, with normal political activities and rights suspended. It was administered by the civil service, and controlled by the military, with General Ayub Khan in unquestioned command. Generally, Ayub's dictatorship was benevolent and popular. Under his firm hand, the country began to regain its confidence and to turn again to the tasks of national development. In the early months of the new regime the main efforts were devoted, as Ayub promised, "to put this mess right and put the country on an even keel." In accordance with the recommendations of a number of commissions, substantial reforms were made in law, in education, in land tenure in West Pakistan, and in other areas of national life.

BASIC DEMOCRACY

The most highly publicized and most comprehensive of all the innovations was announced in the Basic Democracies Order of October 27, 1959. The Basic Democracies scheme provided a comprehensive pattern of government, administration, and development; it was a four-tier system, beginning with Union Councils in the rural areas (or Town Committees in towns or Union Committees in urban areas), composed largely of directly-elected members, and proceeding up-

ward to Tehsil Councils in West Pakistan and Thana Councils in East Pakistan, to District Councils, and finally to Divisional Councils. Later this structure was extended to embrace Assemblies in both West and East Pakistan, and a National Assembly. Except for the basic units—Union Councils, Town Committees, and Union Committees—the members of the various tiers of the Basic Democracies consisted of chairmen of the basic units and nominated officials and non-officials.

The new Basic Democracies system was introduced speedily throughout both wings of Pakistan, with a great deal of publicity and fanfare. On the whole it has worked well, especially in mobilizing popular interest and participation in local affairs. Studies have revealed, however, that the majority of the people of the country, who live in scattered villages, who are largely illiterate, who have little knowledge of or interest in matters outside of their own narrow worlds, and who have little comprehension of the broader political purposes of the Basic Democracies scheme.

These broader political purposes have obviously been uppermost in the minds of Ayub Khan and his associates. When the Basic Democracies Order was promulgated, Ayub declared:

I had promised to you on the very day of the Revolution that our ultimate aim was to restore democracy of the type that our people would understand and work. I am grateful to God that he has enabled me to redeem my promise.

But Ayub realized that much work remained to be done before martial law could give way to a system of democracy "of the type that our people would understand and work." In this task he faced an almost unresolvable dilemma. How could some new pattern be evolved which could avoid the abuses of the previous experience with parliamentary democracy, provide political stability for the country, and still be democratic? Ayub's own answer seemed to be to extend the institutions of Basic Democracy to the top of the political structure, to make the elected members of the basic units of Basic Democracies the electorate for choosing members of the Provincial and

National Assemblies and the President of Pakistan, to introduce a strong presidential system, and to continue to ban political parties. This new kind of "democracy"—obviously another version of controlled democracy—would be introduced gradually, and would be given increasing scope for its operation if it worked well and if the people responded to it.

On February 17, 1960, to assist him in preparing for the restoration of "democracy," Ayub appointed a Constitution Commission, headed by a former Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Muhammad Shahabuddin. Justice Shahabuddin agreed to serve in this capacity only on Ayub's assurance that the Commission would have complete freedom in its investigations and its findings and that its report would be published. The report was not submitted to the President until May, 1961, and it was not made public until March, 1962, shortly after the new Constitution was promulgated. It contained a number of recommendations which Ayub Khan was known to disapprove.

Instead of indirect election of members of the Provincial and National Assemblies and the President of Pakistan, it proposed direct election on the basis of restricted franchise. In spite of Ayub's known aversion to political parties, the Commission stated: "If we want to have a democratic form of government, our endeavour should be to create conditions in which parties based on principle can emerge and we hope that such parties will soon come into existence in the form of government we have recommended." The Commission emphasized "the urgent necessity of return to the representative form of government," which it concluded should be the presidential and not the parliamentary form.

Dissatisfied with some of the recommendations of the Constitution Commission, Ayub Khan appointed a Cabinet sub-committee, headed by the Minister for External Affairs, Manzur Qadir, a brilliant lawyer, to prepare the text of the new Constitution. Qadir and his associates worked for months on this difficult assignment, in close touch with the President himself. Apparently some changes were

made even at the last moment, mainly as concessions to East Pakistan.

The new Constitution, enacted and proclaimed by Ayub Khan on March 1, 1962, provided for a strong presidential form of government, with a federal or quasi-federal structure. Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies, all unicameral, and the President were to be chosen by the elected members of the Union Councils, Town Committees, and Union Committees. Thus at present about 80,000 persons constitute the electorate in a nation of some 95 million people. Political parties were banned unless authorized by an act of the National Assembly. The responsibility for deciding whether a proposed law does or does not violate the "Principles of Law-making"—i.e., the fundamental rights—embodied in the Constitution devolves upon the Legislatures, and not upon the Supreme Court.

On April 28 the "Basic Democrats" of Pakistan cast their votes for 150 members of the new National Assembly (six women were elected a short time later), and on May 6 they chose the members of the two Provincial Assemblies. A striking feature of the results was that the great majority of the elected members of the legislative bodies were former members of banned political parties, mostly former Muslim Leaguers, including Ayub Khan's brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan. Only three members of Ayub's Cabinet were candidates for election to the National Assembly. All were reelected, and all remained in the revised Cabinet, formed after the elections.

In his address to the opening session of the National Assembly on June 8, 1962—the day on which the Constitution entered into force—Ayub Khan urged the members "to give an honest trial to the Constitution." He reminded them that their "foremost obligation" was not to amend the Constitution but "to work and defend it," and he warned: "I do not think it will be wise to be in a hurry to change or amend it. The experience of some other countries who have been in such haste in these matters should be an eye-opener for us." Many members of the new Assembly seemed to disregard the President's advice

and warning. They soon became so active in forming groups to agitate for the restoration of political parties that Ayub himself, in spite of his frequently proclaimed opposition to parties, was responsible for pushing through the Assembly in July a bill sanctioning the formation of parties under license.

Thus the new Assembly began its work in anything but a constructive and cooperative mood. Its actions, as *The New York Times* reported, provoked criticism "that there is the same low standard of political morality now as there was in the years before the army stepped in." It is apparent that many Pakistanis want more representative government than Ayub Khan has dared to give them. Too many concessions made too soon, however, might lead to increasing chaos in the country, which in turn would probably culminate either in a restoration of martial law by Ayub Khan or in a major political upheaval of an unpredictable nature. The outlines of Pakistan's new political order are still not clear.

EAST PAKISTANI DISCONTENT

One of the most serious problems facing Pakistan, under any political system, is that of preserving the integrity of the nation. Pakistan has a serious East-West problem. The two wings of the country are separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory and by many psychological, historic, cultural, and economic divides. East Pakistan is a disaffected area. It is only one-sixth as large as West Pakistan, but it contains 55 per cent of the total population of the country. The Bengalis of East Pakistan nurse many grievances. They claim that they are being discriminated against in a variety of ways.

In proof of this they point to the fact that the per capita income in their Province is far below that of West Pakistanis, that most of the capital that is being invested in East Pakistan belongs to West Pakistanis, that only about five per cent of the members of the Armed Forces and only a handful of the senior civil servants of Pakistan are East Pakistanis, that whereas they earn some 70 per cent of the foreign exchange of the country,

chiefly through the export of jute, most of the development expenditures are in the already more highly industrialized West wing. They maintain that Pakistan should be treated as "two economies," not one, with equal attention being given to each.

East Pakistan's disaffection is of long standing. It was not so apparent during the first months of the Ayub Khan regime, because many East Pakistanis believed that this regime was good for the country and would lead to a better deal for them, and because direct expressions of discontent would be sternly suppressed. The appointment of General Azam Khan as Governor of East Pakistan proved to be a popular move. Although a Pathan from West Pakistan, General Azam Khan was an energetic administrator, very influential with Ayub Khan, who took a deep personal interest in the affairs of East Pakistan. His resignation in the spring of 1962, presumably because of differences with Ayub over policies toward East Pakistan, was an indication that the discontent in East Pakistan was again being openly expressed.

Many other evidences of this discontent had been manifest before Azam Khan's resignation. The arrest of former Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy in late January, and other incidents at about the same time were followed by student demonstrations in Dacca and elsewhere in the Province and by renewed demands for equality of treatment with West Pakistan. Members of the Cabinet were hooted and prevented from addressing student audiences, and even Ayub Khan himself was informed bluntly of East Pakistan's complaints when he visited that province in early February. More attention is now being paid to the demands of East Pakistanis, but it is apparent that it will be a long time before the volatile Bengalis of the Eastern Province will feel that they are being treated as first class citizens of Pakistan.

Whatever its political difficulties, Pakistan has been making impressive economic progress in recent years. When the October, 1958, revolution occurred, the country was in the midst of its First Five Year Plan. Although this was a modest plan, it was already in

difficulties, due to a series of external and internal factors, including a rise in prices at home and abroad, a deterioration in the terms of trade, unfavorable weather, poor cost estimates, administrative shortcomings, and, above all, the deteriorating political situation. To the extent that the targets in the public sector of the Plan were achieved, this can be attributed largely to the improved political situation after October, 1958, and to the initiative of Ayub Khan and his associates.

ECONOMIC PLANNING

Total expenditures under the Plan were hardly more than \$2 billion—about \$1.3 billion in the public sector, and \$715 million in the private sector. Industrial development was impressive, especially in cotton textiles and sugar production. Because of a serious lag in agricultural production, nearly \$140 million of precious foreign exchange had to be spent for imported food grains. Instead of estimated increases in national income of 15 per cent and of per capita income of 7 per cent, the actual figures at the end of the Plan were 11 and 3 per cent, respectively. It is a striking fact that the targets of the Plan in the private sector were slightly exceeded, in spite of the unfavorable environment in which the private sector had to function.

In preparing the Second Five Year Plan, which was officially launched in 1960, the Planning Commission and the Economic Council, both of which were under Ayub Khan's direct supervision, took a more realistic view of the needs and resources of the country. The main objectives of the Plan were summarized by President Ayub in a radio broadcast on December 30, 1960, when the outline of the Plan was made public:

First, we must increase the wealth of the country by a determined effort to raise our agricultural and industrial production. In agriculture, our primary aim must be to grow enough on our soil to feed the nation. . . . In industry, we must aim at substantial but selective development. . . . Second, we must earn our own living in the world by exporting more . . . and by making for ourselves more of the goods we have previously imported. . . . Third, we must provide work for our people. . . . Fourth, we must

improve the social services—education, health, and housing especially. . . . Finally, we must do all we can to help the less prosperous areas of our country.

The revised estimates of the Second Plan, announced in 1961, contemplated expenditures of \$4.83 billion over a five-year period—\$3.07 billion to be financed by government and \$1.76 billion by private enterprise. In the public sector the emphasis was to be heavily on water and power, and then on transport, communications and agriculture. In the semi-public and private sectors the main emphasis was to be on industrial development. The foreign exchange requirements were estimated to be \$2.3 billion, nearly one-half of the total expenditures of the Plan period. It is anticipated that most of this amount, representing about 40 per cent of the total expenditures, will come from foreign aid, mainly from the United States.

This heavy dependence on foreign aid seems deplorable but necessary to Pakistan's planners. While it will be difficult for Pakistan to raise such substantial loans and grants from abroad, the entire \$945 million loan which Pakistan sought for the first three years of the Second Plan from the so-called "Aid-to-Pakistan" Consortium, composed of the World Bank, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other developed countries, has already been pledged. During the period of the Second Plan it is estimated that an additional \$693 million will be spent on Indus Basin replacement works (the financing of which is specially provided for in the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement of 1960) and another \$336 million on a "Works Programme." Almost all the expenditures for these purposes must come from foreign loans and grants, and chiefly from the United States.

It is difficult to evaluate a comprehensive program for national development such as Pakistan has now undertaken. The Second Plan is frighteningly ambitious in terms of available resources, and frighteningly modest in terms of needs.

A striking feature in Pakistan's approach to economic planning is the heavy reliance

which it places on private enterprise and a minimum of controls, in contrast to the Indian approach, which is based on the assumption, as the Election Manifesto of the Congress Party, issued in late 1961, proclaimed, that "the public sector will increasingly expand and play a dominant role." Pakistan's Second Plan contains the following pledge:

The creative energies of the people can be best harnessed to the needs of development if policies of economic liberalism are pursued. . . . the aim is to push ahead with industrial development by encouraging private enterprise in all practicable ways and by freeing the economy from superfluous restraints.

Actually, with the compulsion of planning in an underdeveloped country, the Government has to play a major role in economic planning and development. India too could subscribe to these words in Pakistan's Second Plan: ". . . in regard to the respective roles of public and private sectors, a pragmatic approach has been followed."

For obvious reasons, Pakistan has concentrated more on problems of internal economic and political development than on foreign affairs. Even its internal progress, however, is dependent to a large degree on its success or failure in obtaining outside assistance. Moreover, one aspect of its foreign relations, namely its relations with India, is of primary concern.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

In a sense, Indo-Pakistan relations are hardly foreign relations at all, for the two countries share a common historical experience, occupy the same subcontinent, and are bound by innumerable ties. Unfortunately, their relations have been strained since partition, and at the present time they are in a particularly unhappy state of mutual criticism and recrimination, as a reading of the press of the two countries will reveal.

After Ayub Khan came into power in Pakistan there were high hopes for a real improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan had a leader who could hold his own with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,

and who genuinely wished to resolve the many issues in dispute between the two countries, most of all the Kashmir question. In late 1959 and early 1960 the two governments reached agreement on almost all their remaining border disputes. The solution of the canal waters dispute, thanks to the good offices of the World Bank, after some eight years of negotiation removed a major stumbling-block in the way of improved relations. In September, 1960, Prime Minister Nehru went to Karachi, and there joined President Ayub Khan and Mr. W. A. B. Iliff, representing the World Bank, in signing the Indus Waters Treaty. Immediately afterwards he and Ayub spent several days together, discussing a great range of subjects affecting Indo-Pakistan relations. "The two leaders," according to the communiqué which was issued simultaneously in Karachi and New Delhi on September 23, "acknowledged that the settlement of the Indus Basin Waters question and the elimination of their border disputes presented to their two Governments an unparalleled opportunity to direct their policies towards the promotion of mutual understanding and friendly cooperation between their two countries."

Instead of improving, relations between India and Pakistan began to go from bad to worse soon after the auspicious developments of September, 1960. Perhaps because he was unable to obtain concessions from Nehru regarding Kashmir, President Ayub Khan and other Pakistani spokesmen began to take a harder line toward India. The Pakistani press, which was operating under the controls of martial law, became increasingly vitriolic in its attacks on India, and its criticisms were matched in kind, if not quite in degree, by the Indian newspapers.

Pakistani spokesmen were particularly critical of India's military occupation of Goa in December, 1961, and Pakistan tried to promote its own interests in international circles by exploiting the disfavor into which India had fallen in certain Western countries as a result of the Goa action. *Dawn*, the leading newspaper of Pakistan, charged that "as soon as India feels strong enough to do

so, she will not hesitate to launch the same kind of aggression against Pakistan as she has done against Goa."

As usual, however, the Kashmir question was the major source of Indo-Pakistan friction. In the aftermath of the Goa affair Pakistan decided to bring this question again before the Security Council of the United Nations, for the first time since 1958. The question was discussed briefly in the Security Council on February 1, 1962, but, against Pakistan's wishes, further discussion was postponed until after India's third general elections, held later in February. In May and June the representative of Pakistan, Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, who, by an interesting coincidence, had been Pakistan's chief spokesman when the Kashmir question was first discussed in the Security Council early in 1948, at India's request, and the representatives of India, C. S. Jha and V. K. Krishna Menon, made lengthy statements—or restatements—of the positions of their countries on this major bone of contention. On June 22, an innocuous resolution submitted by Ireland (supported by the United States and the United Kingdom, but opposed by India) calling for a resumption of direct negotiations on the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India was defeated by a Soviet veto.

Frustrated in its latest attempts to reach some agreement with India on Kashmir, either through direct negotiations or through the United Nations, Pakistan seems to be determined to keep the Kashmir question before the forum of world opinion and to give India no rest until and unless its larger neighbor agrees to some acceptable resolution. It is in a state of continued irritation, resentment, and frustration because of its failure to obtain a settlement on Kashmir. President Ayub Khan has repeatedly promised that such a settlement will be achieved, but no mutually-acceptable solution seems to be in sight.

With another near neighbor, Afghanistan, Pakistan is also on unfriendly terms. In early September, 1961, the Government of Pakistan, exasperated because of the many

restrictions and indignities imposed on its representatives in Afghanistan, closed its consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, and ordered Afghanistan to close its Pakistani consulates and trade missions—which it charged had become centers of espionage and intrigue. In retaliation Afghanistan, on September 6, broke off diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and a few days later it stopped all transit of goods through Pakistan—its main avenue of access to American aid and other supplies from non-Communist countries.

Since then the two Muslim neighbors, which had often been at odds before September, 1960, have had no direct official relations, and have been carrying on a bitter propaganda campaign against each other. The only obvious beneficiary from such a situation is the Soviet Union. A well-intentioned but probably ill-advised effort on the part of the United States to persuade Pakistan and Afghanistan to patch up their differences, through the good offices of an experienced American diplomat, Livingston Merchant, had little apparent result except to convince Pakistan that the United States had allowed itself to be used against Pakistan by the Afghans and that the American view of the real situation in Afghanistan was naive, to put it in its most charitable light. In July, 1962, at the conclusion of a state visit by the Shah of Iran, an official statement from Rawalpindi announced that President Ayub Khan had "readily accepted His Majesty's good offices between Afghanistan and Pakistan as it has always been Pakistan's policy and desire to establish and maintain close and brotherly relations with Afghanistan, a Muslim neighbor."

At the present time Pakistan seems to be in what may be described as a mood of "new realism" in its foreign as well as in its domestic affairs. This mood has been created by its many disappointments and frustrations, at home and abroad. It is manifest in its harder tone toward India, in its growing dissatisfaction with the military alliances of which it is a member (and with its chief ally, the United States), in its recent over-

tures to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and in the increasing frequency of the statements by its highest leaders of a firm intention to look to their own resources for survival. A typical statement of recent Pakistani opinion was included in an editorial in the Karachi *Morning News* in January, 1962:

President Ayub hit the nail on the head when he asserted the other day that if India attacks Pakistan we shall not depend so much on CENTO and SEATO as on our own armed forces and the whole nation which has to stand on guard against aggression. Whatever the basic postulates of our foreign policy in the past we must reorient our thinking to meet the new dangers and prepare ourselves afresh with one sole objective—the survival of Pakistan in the midst of its enemies.

FOREIGN POLICY REORIENTATED

In a major speech on foreign policy in the Pakistan National Assembly on June 27, 1962, the new Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali—who had been Prime Minister when Pakistan adopted an alignment policy, entered into a military arrangement with the United States and joined SEATO and the Cento Pact—sounded almost like Jawaharlal Nehru when he said:

We do not propose to be a camp follower of any power group. It does not flow from our membership in the two pacts that we would allow ourselves to be taken for granted. We instead follow a policy which would enable us to judge all international issues on merits and adopt a course of action which would be in the best interests of Pakistan.

Furthermore, "the foreign policy of India, in so far as Pakistan is concerned," Ali flatly charged, "is aimed at isolating and strangulating us." He was rather mild in expressing the growing dissatisfaction in Pakistan with the results flowing from its membership in the military pacts. "These pacts," he said, "have served a useful purpose at a time when we were apparently friendless and alone. We are, however, not fully satisfied with these pacts, although it cannot be denied that they have afforded us some protection."

The Foreign Minister went out of his way

to express his country's desire for closer and more cordial relations with the Soviet Union and China. He referred to the agreement signed in 1961 with the Soviet Union—the first agreement Pakistan had made with a Communist country—for the development of Pakistan's oil resources. He declared that Pakistan wished "to establish concrete relations" with Russia "in the scientific, economic and cultural fields." He also intimated that the Soviet Union had sacrificed "a principle for partisan consideration" in supporting the Indian position regarding Kashmir, and he said that "by their exercise of their veto recently in the Security Council they have deeply shocked public opinion in Pakistan."

For reasons that are still not entirely clear—certainly to embarrass India, possibly to put pressure on the United States, perhaps to placate public opinion in the country, and obviously to promote their own concepts of national interest—the leaders of Pakistan are now actively wooing Communist China. Mohammad Ali spoke of his "personal friendship with the great Chinese leader Chou En-lai," and he declared that "The recent agreement between China and Pakistan to demarcate the common border should help towards the achievement of our mutual desire to establish and promote close relations." China seems to be in no hurry to get down to concrete negotiations on the border problem, and seems to be more interested in keeping this threat hanging over India while it seeks to persuade Pakistan to join with it in some more general understanding, perhaps as a means of alienating Pakistan still further from the United States and from Seato and Cento. In any event, the recent wooing of China by Pakistan is a new departure in Pakistan's foreign policy, which may be symptomatic of further reorientation by a troubled Asian ally.

Acknowledging that the United States is "the country from which we get the most support and assistance," and also that "there has been in recent months a considerable amount of public criticism of the United States of America's policies towards India,"

Mohammad Ali said that "we believe in being frank with our friends," and that "a happy feature of our relations with the United States is the complete frankness with which we exchange our views which result in better understanding and fruitful cooperation." Certainly the United States has had a spate of frank statements from Pakistan sources in recent months, from the remarkably candid utterances of President Ayub Khan during his American visit in July, 1961, to the address of Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali on June 27, 1962, and beyond.

The Pakistan press has carried its frankness toward the United States to the point of open hostility. Some excerpts from a bitter editorial entitled "The End of a Delusion," which appeared in the *Dacca Morning News* of January 15, 1962, may be cited as an extreme but not untypical example. After charging "American duplicity in the game of power politics," the editorial stated:

Whether the Government of Pakistan did or did not subscribe to our view of American policy, we have always been convinced that, pacts or no pacts, if America were to choose between Pakistan and India, the choice would be against us. The basic motivation of American foreign policy throughout these years has been its opposition to Communism and at no stage was it inspired by a genuine desire to preserve peace and stability. . . . The clear implication of the sinister move is the American recognition of India's overlordship in Asia. . . . Mr. Kennedy's assurances to our President were no more than an eyewash and the pledge that Pakistan would be consulted in the matter of U.S. aid to India has been brazen-facedly thrown to the winds. . . .

Statements of this kind should probably be interpreted as evidences of internal frustrations and complexes, extreme sensitivity regarding India, and the "new realism" in foreign and domestic policies, rather than as proof of anti-American feeling. Pakistanis are in a rather truculent mood at present. They feel that the United States is paying too much attention to India, a "dubious neutral," and too little to Pakistan, a "faithful ally." For different reasons, especially the resentment occasioned by the reactions

in the United States to the occupation of Goa and the American support of the resolution on Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council, Indians, too, are showing remarkable frankness and virtuosity in their criticisms of the United States. But basically the relations of the United States with both India and Pakistan are good. There is no reason whatever why the United States should "choose" between the two great states of South Asia, and neither country has any right to ask that such a choice be made. This is not a matter of "duplicity" or "power politics," but of elementary considerations of mutual interest and common sense.

Any American who has had an opportunity to have close contacts with Indians and Pakistanis must have gained some sympathetic understanding of their problems and aspirations, and must have been impressed with their warm friendliness towards Americans as people and towards the United States as a leading nation of the democratic world. These insights will far outweigh any irritations or disagreements, on a national as well as on a personal level. Thus far, for obvious reasons, India is better known in America and to Americans than is Pakistan. Hence aside from the military alliance between the United States and Pakistan, there are special and compelling reasons why Americans should become better acquainted with Pakistan and Pakistanis, whose President has said: "We shall stand by our commitments and prove we are steady, dependable friends."

Norman D. Palmer has visited Pakistan six times during the past decade. A member of the South Asia Regional Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania, he has recently returned from a study tour of South Asia as a Research Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest book is *The Indian Political System*. He is now engaged in writing a book on South Asia and United States policy for the Council on Foreign Relations.

Now that the crisis is over, "West Irian can no longer be used as an excuse to delay facing economic problems, to ignore the differences between the anti-Communist Army and the P.K.I., to draw up fantastic budgets with incredible deficits. . . ."

Indonesia: "The Year of Triumph"

By EWA T. PAUKER

*Consultant to the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, California*

In the years since Indonesia's independence, the problem of West Irian has increasingly dominated all aspects of her life. Until 1957, the matter was brought before the United Nations four times. In December, 1957, the Indonesian government took over from the Netherlands all existing Dutch enterprises in Indonesia, thus trying to pressure the Dutch on the problem of Irian. On January 11, 1958, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian which was to serve as the official channel for the struggle to regain the island territory. In August, 1960, Indonesia broke off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands over this same issue.

Finally on December 19, 1961, the thirteenth anniversary of the Second Dutch military action, President Sukarno issued in Jogjakarta the *Trikora* (the triple command):

1. Frustrate the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial make.
2. Unfurl the Honored Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesian native land.
3. Be ready for general mobilization to defend the independence and unity of Country and Nation. . . . That is my command.

President Sukarno also revived his revolutionary slogan: "We love peace but we love freedom more." In preparation for possible war, the President decreed the formation of the Mandala Unified Command, on January

4, 1962, with Brigadier General Suharto as commander. This constituted a theatre command in East Indonesia to be used as a base for possible military operations in West Irian.

In 1962, the West Irian question took precedence over every other major issue. This concentration on a single problem has affected and influenced the Indonesian economy, society, existing political parties and foreign relations. It is therefore relevant, when studying Indonesia in 1962, to do so in the light of the West Irian issue.

It is futile to question whether the Indonesians misinterpreted the original Round Table Agreements of 1949, which they understood would give West Irian to Indonesia one year after the transfer of sovereignty of the rest of the former Netherlands East Indies. It is equally useless to ask whether the Papuan population of the area is Indonesian. Nationalism inflamed by an "irredenta" knows no reason, and Indonesian nationalism is no exception. To Indonesians the issue of West Irian was a real issue to which they had been committed for many years. It therefore cannot be regarded as a mere maneuver to detract attention from domestic or other problems.

The West Irian problem was of great importance to President Sukarno. It should be recalled that the President was never elected to his office but owes it to his role during the

revolution. His mandate of power comes from the part he played in helping to fulfill successfully the nationalistic desires of his people. In November, 1962, he was proclaimed, in addition to his numerous other titles, Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution. His stubbornness on Irian, his persistent demands for an almost unconditional Dutch surrender of it, and the successful conclusion of the dispute, could be as effective politically in Indonesia as a landslide election would be in our country. It would appear, at least on the surface, that due to Irian the domestic position of the President and his government has been temporarily strengthened.

It would also seem that the Communist party of Indonesia (P.K.I.), which is the largest Communist party outside the Soviet bloc¹, has improved its domestic position thanks to Irian. The P.K.I. has supported the struggle to regain Irian with great fervor. At the Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the P.K.I. in April, 1962, the Communists emphatically endorsed President Sukarno's campaign to regain Irian this year by any means. The P.K.I. was extremely militant in its support for the West Irian cause, and advocated war. P.K.I. leaders questioned possible Dutch sincerity during the secret negotiations and recalled that the Netherlands had repeatedly broken her word during the negotiations for the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Next to President Sukarno, the P.K.I. was certainly one of the most active groups in demanding the transfer of the territory.

The P.K.I.'s domestic situation was certainly enhanced by associating itself so wholeheartedly with a popular nationalistic cause which was settled successfully. In the long run the Party would have benefited even more

had the issue been solved by war rather than by peaceful negotiations, a solution it seemed to favor judging by the statements made at the Seventh Extraordinary Congress. The slogan of this congress was "For Democracy, Unity and Mobilization." Had the dispute ended in war, Indonesia would perhaps have become isolated more than ever from the West and dependent on the Communist bloc not only for arms and supplies but also for moral support in the international forum. Domestically, the P.K.I. would have profited greatly from such a turn of events. Thus although the P.K.I. strengthened its position by associating itself with the Irian cause it probably did not gain all the political benefits which would have accrued to it in the event of war against the Dutch.

IRIAN AND THE P.K.I.

Thanks to the West Irian issue any possible showdown between the anti-Communist Army and the P.K.I. was also postponed, giving the latter an extra period of time to improve its organization, enroll more members and gain in prestige while remaining basically unmolested under the President's protection. At the Seventh Congress in April, 1962, the Secretary General of the P.K.I., D.N. Aidit, revealed that the Party is now conducting its second Three Year Plan for the training and organization of cadres, with special emphasis on training.

There is one more factor deriving from the West Irian issue which could, in the long run, strengthen the position of the P.K.I. Since he proposed Guided Democracy in 1957, President Sukarno has increasingly committed himself to what he calls a "*gotong rojong*" cabinet, that is, a cabinet which was originally to be based on the four major parties, the P.N.I., Masjumi, N.U., and P.K.I. Though the Masjumi has since been banned, Sukarno is still committed to including the P.K.I. In March, 1962, the President drew two Communists into his government; however, they are only ministers without portfolio. To date, opposition to the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet has been too strong to allow Sukarno to give the P.K.I.

¹ The P.K.I. claimed more than two million members in April, 1962. In addition the Communist Party controls large mass organizations such as S.O.B.S.I. (a federation of trade unions) claiming over three million members, B.T.I. (Peasants' Front) which has recently claimed 5.7 million members, GERWANI (a women's organization) claiming 1.2 million members, as well as youth and cultural organizations with followings of substantial size.

executive responsibility in the Indonesian government.

As a result of their staunch support of President Sukarno on the Irian problem, P.K.I. leaders could very well ask the President to give them posts with responsibility in the cabinet. If, as a result of West Irian, the P.K.I. manages to get into the government, then its role in the Irian dispute will have more than repaid the part it played.

The West Irian issue has also had an important impact on Indonesia's foreign relations. Her very belligerent posture, her threats and deadlines, her purchases of masses of military equipment from the Soviet Union have not led the West to regard Indonesia with great warmth in the recent past. Even without a war, the West was placed in an embarrassing position since the Netherlands, one of Nato's most loyal European supporters, was actively involved.

Meanwhile, Irian provided a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union in Indonesia. Credits to Indonesia for military equipment from Communist bloc countries are estimated to have reached one billion dollars. Since the famous arms-buying mission to Moscow led by General Nasution in January, 1961, a number of other missions have been sent by Indonesia for the same purpose. Among the more recent delegations was one led by Air Marshal Omar Dani in February, 1962, shortly after his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In May, Foreign Minister Subandrio went to Moscow to purchase military equipment which was, according to the agreement, "not to be used for aggressive purposes but to liberate West Irian."

In return, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Soviet Union, Marshal K. Vershinin, visited Indonesia in June. On his arrival at Kemajoran Airport he reiterated Premier Khrushchev's pledge to help Indonesia regain Irian and thus create a country reaching from Sabang to Merauke. He also gave Indonesia expert professional advice, saying in Jogjakarta: "The struggle to regain West Irian can certainly be successfully settled by Indonesia." In July, Anastas I. Mikoyan, a Soviet deputy premier, arrived

in Indonesia to help President Sukarno officiate at the ceremonies opening the Senajan Sports Stadium, built with Soviet aid for the just concluded Asian Games. During the opening ceremonies Mikoyan once again stressed Soviet sympathies with Indonesia's efforts to regain Irian and commented on the friendship existing between the two countries, exemplified by the new stadium which he called a "monument to friendship" between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.

It was largely due to West Irian that, especially in the last year, Indonesia has drawn closer to the Soviet bloc and further from the West. But the peaceful settlement has considerably decelerated this process. The West can regard the Irian settlement as a great victory in slowing down the advance of communism in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has gained an important foothold in Indonesia including the heavy debt incurred by Indonesia's substantial military purchases.

THE ECONOMY

The Indonesian economy has never been sound. It enjoyed a brief honeymoon during the Korean war but thereafter it has been in a steady decline. In 1962, the economy became so weak that for the first time large-scale deaths due to famine were reported. The *Harian Rakjat*, the mouthpiece of the P.K.I., reported 40,000 deaths in Central Java. Much concern for the economic situation was expressed earlier this year by other than Communist circles. The Government has been able to make little progress to increase the supply of food and clothing, which was one of the expressed goals of the present cabinet.

Improvement of the economy, like most other internal problems, was temporarily set aside in Indonesia till the West Irian question was settled. Economic shortages were brushed off as part of the suffering necessary for the completion of the revolution. All national potentials were mobilized for West Irian. Rice, of which Indonesia imports a million tons a year to supplement her own production, was distributed free of charge to

those who volunteered to fight in Irian. High school and university students had to take part in military training. Professors complained that academic life was totally disrupted; students did not attend classes because they had to drill three days a week.

West Irian also cut a deep hole in the national budget for 1962 which anticipated a deficit of Rupiah 37 billion, not including the expenses incurred for West Irian. This alone well describes the economic situation and the impact the Irian affair could have had on it. The future of the economy will be seriously influenced by the fact that Indonesia will soon have to start making repayments to the Soviet Union for the arms purchased for the Irian campaign. The Soviets have a reputation for lack of leniency in such matters. Thus the prospects for a rapid future improvement of the economic situation have been seriously jeopardized by the West Irian dispute.

All segments of society were also to a greater or lesser degree dominated by Irian. Students were trained. Volunteers were mobilized. Though no over-all figures were published, registration by districts revealed that an incredibly large number of persons volunteered. Campaigns were started all over the country to raise money for West Irian and to make contributions in kind: watches for the volunteers, typewriters for journalists to cover the progress made in the area and other similar goods.

More important was the fact that West Irian was used as an excuse for various social curbs. For example, the government in May, 1962, once again recommended that the general elections be postponed, since the task of regaining Irian required the full attention of the people. The Indonesian press, already tightly controlled, was further curbed and forbidden to print any news which might cause "disturbances." The interpretation given to the word "disturbance" was very flexible. The daily press was constantly filled with items regarding the progress of the guerrillas in Irian; the latest speeches on the campaign saturated the readers' minds with this one overwhelming subject. Few

indeed were the public addresses delivered at this time on any subject which did not include at least a few words about Irian.

The area of East Indonesia, which had only recently been freed of the P.R.R.I.-Permesta Rebellion of 1958, was once again militarized under the Mandala Theatre Command. The civilian governor of the area was made military governor. Even the province of West Irian, which had been set up in 1956 to include the eastern-most areas of the territory already Indonesian, was reconstituted on January 4, 1962, to include the still Dutch Netherlands New Guinea. The capital of this new province was to be Kotabaru, the new name for the still Dutch town of Hollandia.

ARMY BENEFITS

Perhaps the only institution in Indonesia which maintained a level of sobriety *vis à vis* the problem of West Irian was the Army. Since allegedly only volunteers were dropped into the area, the participation of the Army in the undeclared guerrilla war was limited to training of volunteers and logistic support. The Army benefited considerably from the Irian campaign. With little effort, it acquired modern equipment which made it equal and even superior to any other national army in Southeast Asia. This in itself gave the Army prestige in the eyes of the Indonesian people.

In the past, the Army in Indonesia held great power due to its role in the revolution, the security situation, various rebellions and the seizure of Dutch enterprises, many of which were placed under Army supervision. During this year of feverish activity in West Irian, the Army concentrated on planning for the future. On July 5, 1962, an agreement was signed between the Staff and Command School in Bandung and two leading universities, Padjadjaran and the University of Indonesia, for future cooperation and exchange of ideas between the military and the civilian authorities.

While making these plans for the future the Army was not idle, and restored the security situation in Java which is perhaps the most significant achievement made in

Indonesia this year. Since 1949, normal life in West Java had constantly been disrupted by the terrorism of the Darul Islam, a fanatical Muslim group which, under the leadership of their Imam, Kartosuwirjo, never accepted the secular Republic of Indonesia. To this group are attributed innumerable atrocities including an average of 2,000 murders a year. Until 1962, the Army was able to make little progress in restoring security to West Java. But an exerted effort in the last year and a revision of military doctrine resulted in the capture of Kartosuwirjo on June 6, 1962, which was followed by the surrender of many of his D.I. followers. The execution, following court martials, of Kartosuwirjo and of five D.I.'s who were involved in an attempt on President Sukarno's life last May was announced in early September. It looks as though internal security will return completely to Indonesia in 1962.

The West Irian situation was also responsible for some of the changes in the organization of the Army. An example was the establishment of the Mandala Theatre Command as a base for military operations in Irian. On June 17, President Sukarno appointed Major General Ahmad Jani as Chief of Staff of the Army to replace General Nasution who (after having occupied this post since 1955) was now appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, a position which had not been filled in the last ten years. Whether this reshuffle in the top echelons of the Army can be traced to Irian is questionable. However, it is interesting to note that shortly before his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army, Jani was named official spokesman of the Mandala Command on matters relating to the fight for West Irian.

The Army certainly gained much from the Irian affair, in the long run perhaps more than the P.K.I. It procured a large modern arsenal with little effort while devoting its attention to future planning and restoring security. Of its own time and energy it invested little; its participation in the undeclared war was marginal. Paradoxically

it would appear that the Army benefits most from the fact that the West Irian problem was solved peacefully. Among the anti-Communist forces in Indonesia today, the Army is the only force with sufficient power to oppose the P.K.I. effectively. The peaceful settlement of August 15 enhances the power of the Army as a political opposition to the Communists. By not going to war Indonesia did not become totally estranged from the West nor completely dependent on the Soviet Union. A war in Irian would probably have resulted in a spectacular growth of the P.K.I. while the Army was busy fighting the Dutch.

The agreement signed at the United Nations headquarters on August 15² gives President Sukarno's government everything it could have hoped for. In accordance with the proposals worked out by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the Netherlands transferred temporary executive authority over West Irian to the United Nations on October 1 which, in turn, will transfer this responsibility to Indonesia on May 1, 1963. The provisions of the agreement shortened the period of transition to the minimum acceptable to the Dutch. Furthermore, Indonesia succeeded in not having to withdraw its troops, infiltrated into the territory since the issuance of President Sukarno's Trikora, by the device of having them temporarily placed under the authority of the Secretary General of the United Nations. In contrast to the Round Table Conference Agreements of 1949, Indonesia gained considerable flexibility with regard to existing Netherlands commitments concerning concessions and property rights. She will have to honor only "... those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory."

Finally, although the Dutch succeeded in making provisions for the right of self determination of the inhabitants of West Irian, the opportunity to exercise their free choice need not be given to them by Indonesia "... before the end of 1969." President Sukarno has already stated in his Independence Day address that he interprets this freedom of

² For the text of this agreement, see pp. 303ff.

choice to mean "... the right to internal self determination, not of external self determination."

The agreement was signed just in time to permit President Sukarno to announce it to the Indonesian people on the seventeenth anniversary of the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945. On that occasion he stated that Indonesia's territorial aspirations have been fulfilled.

The country is now at a threshold. Numerous problems still exist, many of which are more important than Irian to the welfare, freedom and well-being of the Indonesian people. West Irian can no longer be used as an excuse to delay facing economic problems, to ignore the differences between the anti-Communist Army and the P.K.I., to draw up fantastic budgets with incredible deficits, or to ask Indonesians to defer their claim to all the freedoms and privileges for which they fought their revolution 17 years ago.

Though it will be interesting to watch Indonesia tackle her problems in the near future, perhaps especial attention should be paid to the following. First, how will the recent changes in the Army, such as the appointment of Major General Jani as Chief of Staff of the Army and General Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, affect the anti-Communist posture of the Army? In the past, Jani had gained a reputation for toughness toward the P.K.I. Will his appointment speed up the possibility of a domestic showdown between the Army and the P.K.I.? Or was President Sukarno's decision to change the leadership of the Army an attempt to forestall such a showdown based on a more complete knowledge of Jani's character and plans than is available to us in the West?

Now that the undeclared war is over, the Army will probably have to face demobilization. A country such as Indonesia can not afford a standing army of 250,000 men. It would appear from the appointment of General Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces that the government is planning to revamp its whole military structure.

Demobilization is necessary and General Nasution, who is also Minister of Defense, will have this unpleasant task. Though Indonesia is a young country, it has already learned that demobilization is difficult when the former officers cannot be offered attractive job alternatives.

The behavior of the P.K.I. will also be worth watching in the near future. Now that the West Irian campaign is concluded successfully, the time has come to distribute the spoils of victory. The P.K.I. is certainly high on the list of faithful followers and supporters of President Sukarno. The question is whether the P.K.I. will demand executive responsibility as a reward—a demand which the P.K.I. can easily substantiate by its voting power in the last elections of 1955. If P.K.I. leaders make this demand, how will President Sukarno react? He has long wanted them in the cabinet. If he does exert pressure for their inclusion, will this cause a crisis?

The fourth group of developments worth watching in the future will be how the President will put into final shape his plans for Guided Democracy which is so far not yet complete. How will he cope with the problems of functional representation, with the "*gotong rojong*" cabinet, elections, and the future of political parties? Early in 1962 it was announced that elections would be postponed until after the solution of the West Irian problem. This would normally mean that elections, in which the Communist party might win a majority, would have to be held sometime in 1963. In this context it will also be interesting to see whether old rivalries will be allowed to rise to the surface again or whether the government sponsored National Front will form into a one-party system.

Finally, in his August 17, 1962, speech, in which he characterized the present moment in Indonesian history as "the year of tri-

(Continued on page 312)

Ewa T. Pauker has visited Indonesia twice, in the fall of 1960 and the spring of 1962. She is presently working full time on Indonesia's problems.

The plan for a Federation of Malaysia "would combine all the former British territories in Southeast Asia in one viable unit and make it possible for Britain to surrender gracefully her responsibility in Borneo." The new Federation would also help to protect Southeast Asia from aggressive communism.

Plan for Malaysian Federation

By GERALD P. DARTFORD

Author of A Short History of Malaya

The open conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam have drawn the limelight away from another development in Southeast Asia which may be of great importance to the future of the region. This is the proposal for a Federation of Malaysia on which the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Malaya announced agreement on August 1, 1962. This plan will almost certainly be carried out by August, 1963, and provides for a merger of five former British colonies and protectorates, namely the Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei and the colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak.

The plan for Malaysia¹ is intended to prevent a Communist take-over in Singapore that would be disastrous to Malaya, to British commercial interests, and to Seato's hopes of keeping Southeast Asia in the free world. At the same time, it provides a way in which the last of Britain's colonial responsibilities in the area can be liquidated in such a way that the backward Borneo territories will become partners with countries with which they are linked by history and similar political traditions. Hardly viable on their own, they might well otherwise fall into the acquisitive but less sympathetic hands of Indonesia.

¹ The use of the name Malaysia is unfortunate but apparently unavoidable. Traditionally it has been taken to include the whole of Indonesia as well as the five territories in the proposed federation.

Three years ago the prospect for a reunion of Singapore with the rest of Malaya seemed remote. At that time the leftist Peoples' Action Party (P.A.P.) had won a resounding victory in the elections preceding the inauguration of complete internal self-government for the state of Singapore in June, 1959. As a result the P.A.P. leader, Lee Kuan Yew, a Cambridge-educated lawyer and dedicated Socialist, became the first Prime Minister.

The new Cabinet was young with an average age of 37. Lee and most of his ministers were intellectuals and basically not pro-Communist. But the violence of their anti-colonialism and their anxiety to win their way to power had led them to enlist aid from trade unions, Chinese students and other bodies which they well knew to be under Communist control. The question from the start was whether the Prime Minister and his friends would be able to withstand the pressures from these allies after they were in power.

In any case the problems confronting Lee's government were difficult enough. In Singapore island, 26 miles long and 14 broad, are packed 1.6 million people who at the present rate of increase will pass five million by the end of the century. All ultimately depend for their livelihood upon Singapore's position as one of the world's greatest seaports and a growing industrial complex. Still the principal channel for Malaya's trade, Singapore is also a free port acting as a collecting and

distributing center for a great part of South-east Asia. Its business depends on the continued goodwill of the mainland and on an atmosphere of peace and security that will ensure the smooth working of services in the docks. Lack of these conditions could ruin Singapore almost overnight and scare away the capital for the establishment of new industries that alone can give hope of employment for the growing population.

Confidence has in recent years been shaken by the turbulence and restlessness of Singapore's people. Of the more than a million Chinese, a large proportion are still China-born, live in overcrowded slums where they have little chance to become assimilated Malaysians, and are an easy prey for propaganda from the now-Communist homeland. On several occasions they have erupted in ugly riots and staged crippling strikes. Most disquieting also has been the part taken in these disorders by the students of the Chinese language schools where communism has gained control of the minds of a large section of the rising generation.

At first the business community showed much apprehension of the P.A.P. policy of a "non-Communist Socialist Malaya," but in practice Lee's government turned out to be more moderate than had been expected. It showed great energy in social reforms and the expansion of the educational and health services, but it tried to win the confidence of the merchants by refraining from nationalization and by giving guarantees to encourage investment in Singapore.

It also became apparent that Lee's government put its hopes for union with mainland Malaya above the achievement of socialism for the whole country. Merging Singapore in an independent Federation would be the best chance to end Britain's control of defense and foreign affairs. Accordingly the P.A.P. tried to placate Malay opinion, both on the mainland and at home. A Malay was chosen to be the first *Yang di-Pertuan Negara*, or formal Head of the State. Much was done to aid the Malay minority in Singapore. Above all it was decided that Malay should be the national language of

Singapore, just as it was in the Federation, although most of the island's people speak only Chinese dialects or English and had little interest in learning Malay.

ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT IN MALAYA

This moderation and the Malaysian nationalism of the P.A.P. was not to the liking of the pro-Communist wing, but at first it did not make much impression on the leaders in the Federation either. Here a different situation existed. The Federation consists of eleven states: nine Malay constitutional monarchies, and two former British settlements, Penang and Malacca. Of the population of about 6.5 million, half are Malays, about 38 per cent Chinese, about 10 per cent Indians and 2 per cent other races. In practice, owing to restrictions on citizenship for foreign-born Chinese and Indians, and constitutional safeguards, the Malays have a definite political preponderance. On the other hand, the Chinese control most of the trade and are far wealthier.

This political situation is reflected in the composition of the Alliance which has been in control of the government since the first federal elections in 1955 and which under Tunku Abdul Rahman led the country to independence on August 31, 1957. The leading partner in this coalition is the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.) headed by the Tunku. Except in the backward east coast, it has solid Malay support. The second partner is the Malaysian Chinese Association (M.C.A.), which is mainly representative of the business interests of the more Malaysianized urban Chinese. As in Singapore, the China-born tend to be attracted by left-wing parties, but these are not well organized as yet (with the exception of the Communists which are banned and cannot campaign openly). Much less important is the third partner, the Malaysian Indian Congress. In the Cabinet there are 9 Malays, 2 Chinese and 1 Indian.

The Alliance government has impressed the world by the sensible competence with which it has governed Malaya since independence; in the elections in August, 1959,

it won a comfortable majority for a further term of nearly five years. Although keenly interested in development and in the growth of social services, especially for the rural Malays, the leadership is moderate and conservative. In particular, Tunku Abdul Rahman has taken a firm stand against communism. At the time that the Alliance came to power the Federation was in the midst of a bitter struggle to put down the bands of Communist terrorists who infested the jungles that still cover three-quarters of Malaya. It would have been easy to win support from the left by taking the line that this was a colonialist conflict that could be settled by some compromise leaving the Communists free to resume normal political activities. To his lasting credit the Tunku never wavered in his determination to fight it out. Emergency measures went on after independence with increasing effectiveness until the remnants of the Communist bands were so negligible that the 12-year state of emergency could be brought officially to an end in July, 1960.

It is not surprising that the Alliance government gave a very cool reception to Lee Kuan Yew's ideas for a merger. For one thing, the addition of Singapore's more than a million Chinese would upset the delicate balance between the Malays and other races in the Federation. Reunion might be possible at some time in the distant future, but at present it seemed to Tunku Abdul Rahman that there were too many people in Singapore who looked to China rather than to Malaya as the object of their loyalty. Yet less than two years later, in May, 1961, the Malayan Prime Minister changed his mind and stood forth as the advocate of a larger federation to include not only Singapore but also the three British territories in Borneo.

THE SPLIT IN THE P.A.P.

The reason for this change of heart is to be found in the deteriorating situation in Singapore and the danger that this key city might become a Communist state on Malaya's doorstep.

In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee's troubles began within a year of his election with the

turning against him of Ong Eng Guan, who had previously headed the P.A.P. drive for power in the municipal elections that preceded the Legislative Assembly elections in 1959. As Mayor of Singapore City Ong had gained a large following among the irresponsible youth by his attacks on the city's bureaucracy. On the abolition of the City government Ong was appointed a minister in Lee's government, but was dismissed for his inefficiency and lack of party discipline. Ong then launched an attack on the party leadership that led to his expulsion from the P.A.P. along with two of his followers in June, 1960.

For the rest of the year, Ong kept up his attack in the Assembly. It culminated in a charge of nepotism against Lee Kuan Yew in connection with the appointment of his brother-in-law to a government post. Although a Commission of Inquiry under a judge of the Supreme Court completely exonerated Lee and a majority of the Assembly passed a vote of censure on Ong, Ong remained obdurate. Resigning from the legislature, he stood again for his old constituency of Hong Lim, a poor Chinese district. In a 90 per cent poll Ong roundly defeated the official P.A.P. candidate by 7,747 votes to 2,820.

The slap in the face to Lee's government by the electors of Hong Lim convinced Tunku Abdul Rahman, and he now came down decisively on the side of union, with the proviso that the enlarged federation should include the three Borneo territories as well, in order to keep a non-Chinese majority. In a speech to the U.M.N.O. Conference in Malacca on May 6, 1961, the Tunku announced his decision. Facing the issue squarely he said:

There is a section of the Chinese in Singapore who do not want a good government which works for the good of the people. What they want is a Communist government, or a Communist-orientated government.

Negotiations for merger were started soon afterwards.

Since then, events have moved fast. In Singapore the government lost another seat in a by-election to the ex-Chief Minister David Marshall, who joined in the attack. But more important was the revolt of the pro-

Communist elements in the P.A.P. itself. They realized that merger would mean that the ultimate responsibility for Singapore's internal security would be handed over to the enlarged Federation government, which would almost certainly be headed by the sternly anti-Communist Tunku. Nor did they doubt that if necessary Abdul Rahman would be prepared to use his small but excellently trained Malay army to support his authority. In August, 1961, 13 assemblymen left the P.A.P. and formed the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front), generally accepted as being little more than a cover for the Communists. Lee Kuan Yew found his votes in the assembly reduced to 26 in a house of 51—a bare majority of one. At the same time the powerful labor leader, Lim Chin Siong, split the Trade Union Congress and formed a new labor organization in alliance with the dissidents.

In these circumstances the two Prime Ministers quickly worked out a detailed plan for a Federation of Malaysia. Essentially this would be an extension of the present federation by the admission of Singapore and the Borneo territories as additional states. But it was agreed that Singapore, unlike the other states, would retain control of education and labor, two subjects on which the left-wing parties in the island objected to the Malayan government's policies. This would mean that a larger proportion of the taxes collected in Singapore would have to be returned to the state government.

To balance this concession, Singapore's members in the federal House of Representatives were to be reduced to 15, instead of the 24 to which her population would entitle her as compared with the mainland's 104. These were hard terms for Lee Kuan Yew to accept, but he was in no position to hold out for better. In December, 1961, the plan was approved by the Singapore Assembly after a bitter debate lasting 12 days and ending in a walkout by the opposition.

Meanwhile, Tunku Abdul Rahman hurried to London to get the consent of the British government. On the whole British reaction was favorable to a scheme which would com-

bine all the former British territories in South-east Asia in one viable unit and make it possible for Britain to surrender gracefully her responsibilities in Borneo. Two doubts remained. What was to be the position of the British base in Singapore, so vital to the obligations of Britain and the western world to Seato? And what security could there be that the interests of the primitive peoples of Borneo would be protected, so that they would not become second-class citizens, neglected and misunderstood?

The first problem was resolved more easily than had been expected. Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed that Britain should retain use of the bases, not only for the local defense of Malaysia but also for the use of Seato, which Malaya has up to now refused to join. On the second question, Britain urged caution and further investigation by a commission which was to visit Borneo and try to ascertain the views of the people there.

THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

The Malay leaders in the Federation often talk as if the million inhabitants of British Borneo were blood-brothers who can easily be reunited with the family. Ethnically and linguistically they are remotely related, but, as elsewhere in the East Indies archipelago, the true Malays are found close to the coasts. Only in tiny Brunei do they form a majority. These Malays are Muslims and before the coming of the Europeans their chiefs controlled the coastal districts. Beyond the authority of the Malay rulers the older inhabitants lived in the forested interior much as their descendants do today. Political consciousness is only now just beginning to awaken among these primitive peoples. Many have only the most tenuous links with their territorial governments and can have no understanding of the implications of the Malaysian plan.

The name "Borneo" is a European corruption of Brunei, which came to be used for the whole island because the Sultan of that state was once the most important of the Malay rulers, controlling the whole of the northwest coast. However, during the nineteenth cen-

tury weak rulers surrendered more and more territory to Sarawak and British North Borneo, until all that survived was a mere 2,226 square miles with a population in 1960 of 83,869. This state is still ruled by a Sultan. British protection was accepted in 1888 and a British Resident headed the administration from 1906, on much the same plan as in the Malay states.

Ironically, Sarawak and North Borneo have turned out to be poor in natural resources, but the oilfields recently developed in Brunei make this miniature state second to Canada among the oil-producing countries of the Commonwealth and per capita one of the richest in the world. Thanks to the oil royalties, the Sultan has been able to provide social services for his people on a lavish scale almost without the necessity of taxation, and in these happy circumstances his autocracy has been up to the present accepted without question. Brunei is sitting pretty and has little to gain from federation, but the Sultan, who has maintained friendly relations with the rulers of the Malay states, has said he is willing to accede.

Sarawak, the land of the "White Rajahs," was the first part to be detached from Brunei when the small district round the capital, Kuching, was ceded in 1841 to an English adventurer, James Brooke, in return for assistance in putting down a rebellion. As Rajah he fought a long struggle, with the aid from time to time of the Royal Navy, against the pirates who infested the Borneo coast. At the same time he gradually developed a very personal and paternal government over his subjects who included Malays and Chinese as well as the aboriginal Dyaks. The latter were gradually persuaded to give up the deeply rooted custom of head-hunting, but generally Brooke's policy was to interfere as little as possible with the tribesmen's way of life.

James Brooke left his little kingdom to his nephew, Rajah Charles Brooke, who reigned from 1868 to 1917. During this period Sarawak received five additional slices of territory from Brunei. In 1888, along with the rest of Northern Borneo, Sarawak came under Brit-

ish protection for external affairs, but Charles Brooke and his successor, Vyner Brooke, continued to control the internal affairs of the state up to the Japanese invasion which followed within a few weeks of the centenary of Brooke rule in 1941.

After the war, the third Rajah decided that it would be best for Sarawak to be ceded to Britain so that greater resources would be available for its development. This decision became more fixed when the Rajah was dissatisfied with his nephew and heir presumptive, Anthony Brooke, whom he did not consider suitable to succeed. The cession was, however, carried out in a sudden and tactless manner that left the people confused and resentful. In particular, the Malays were disaffected and were encouraged by Anthony Brooke's natural disappointment and open disapproval of his uncle's action. The second British governor was fatally stabbed just after his arrival, but gradually the country settled down and has since made considerable progress economically and constitutionally.

The almost forgotten origins of British North Borneo have become of some importance owing to the recent Philippine claim to part of this area. In the 1870's this corner of Borneo, then known as Sabah, was subject to the vague suzerainty of Brunei, except for the northeast coast which together with adjacent islands formed the Sultanate of Sulu. This was a notable nest of pirates over whom the Spanish authorities at Manila tried for 300 years to gain some control.

North Borneo was also a happy hunting ground for concession-seeking adventurers, but all their attempts to found settlements faded out except one. This was started by Baron von Overbeck, Austro-Hungarian con-

(Continued on page 312)

Gerald P. Dartford spent 18 years in the education service in Malaya, retiring in 1957 from his position as Assistant Director of Education in the Ministry of Kuala Lumpur. Author of *The Growth of the British Commonwealth*, he is presently teaching at the Salisbury School (Connecticut).

"Will the Japanese be able to solve their problems gradually, peacefully and without foreign interference?" This specialist sees reason for optimism. at least in the near future.

Growing Pains of a Changing Japan

By PAUL F. LANGER

Lecturer in International Relations, University of Southern California

A DECADE has gone by since Japan emerged from foreign tutelage. As anticipated, part of the political and legal structure built by the Allied Occupation has since been torn down or abandoned by independent Japan's conservative leaders. But the socioeconomic metamorphosis of the nation has proceeded largely undisturbed. Over the years, the pattern of Japanese life, social relationships and behavior has been markedly reshaped; by extension, change has begun to affect the Japanese value system as well as the Japanese people's attitudes toward their society, the government and the outside world.

The three most important factors in this development have been the destruction of the traditional social, political and economic order; foreign—especially American—influence in all spheres of Japanese life; and the continuing impact of swift economic change.

Take, for example, Tokyo, now the world's most populous city. The Japanese capital is one vast construction zone attesting to phenomenal economic growth. Giant transmitters tower over the city's roofs with their forest of television antennas. Hundreds of thousands of automobiles crowd the narrow streets where billboards and neon-lights advertise everything from the newest American motion picture to the latest refrigerator off the Japanese assembly lines. Modern department stores display Japanese goods, English ties, Dior gowns and American liquor.

This process of modernization and internationalization is, of course, not limited to Japan. But what is striking in Japan's case is the unprecedented intensity, speed, depth and scope of the transformation.

Tokyo is a pacesetter for the rest of Japan. The change is not confined to a small and sophisticated upper stratum of society; it reaches into the lower income groups as well and affects even the older generation. Japan's two top best sellers in 1961 illustrate the trend of the times: *Eigo no tsuyoku naru hon* (How to Improve Your English) which sold 1.2 million copies in less than six months and *Nandemo mite yaro* (I'll Have A Look at Everything), the travel account of a Japanese graduate student who after a year at Harvard had explored the lower depths of America, Europe and the Near East on a dollar a day.

If Tokyo's traffic congestion can vie with that of New York (10,000 cars are joining the capital's traffic snarl every month), one must recall that just a few years back only the rich and powerful drove through Tokyo's streets. To venture by automobile into the rural areas meant until recently an excursion into a vehicular no-man's land. Today, the peaceful silence of the Japanese countryside is broken by the sputtering of Japan-made compact cars and motorcycles.

The traditional fabric of Japanese life, focused on the family and involving a complex system of duties, responsibilities and hierarchical situations, has been severely

strained; in the case of the younger generation the pattern has been almost totally discarded. The destruction of the family system, the freeing of women from restrictive legal shackles, the elimination from education of the nationalistic and militaristic state cult, the growing opportunities for economic independence, all this has freed Japan's youth from the customary parental and government tutelage.

Rural prosperity and modernization have tended to erase the formerly sharp distinction between village and city, placing television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and electric rice cookers into many rural homes.¹ These material developments, aided by the amazing growth of Japanese mass communications, have also projected modern ideas into the most remote parts of rural Japan.

OVERHEATING AND READJUSTMENT

Two economic miracles have taken place in recent years in Japan. The first involves the outstanding performance of Japanese agriculture. One of the world's most densely populated countries growing at the rate of a million people a year, has somehow succeeded in making itself virtually self-supporting in food, although it has less than 16 per cent of cultivable land. This success must be attributed largely to man-made factors—among them, the increased use of fertilizer and chemicals, advanced farming techniques, rapid mechanization adapted to Japanese conditions (more than half a million small tractors are in use today), the virtual elimination of tenant farming, the diversification of Japan's

eating habits, and the rise of labor productivity.

While agricultural output increases, Japan's farming population is steadily decreasing. In 1950, it still accounted for 45 per cent of the total population. In 1960, it had been reduced to 37 per cent. The government hopes to see this trend continue. Its ten-year plan for the 1960's aims at a further substantial increase in per capita output for agriculture to be made up in large measure through a reduction of the rural labor force. Even if there remain underprivileged rural areas or at least pockets of rural poverty, especially among the inhabitants of Japan's fishing villages and mountain hamlets, the modernization and economic growth of rural Japan are impressive feats that have obvious social and political implications.

The agricultural miracle tends to be overshadowed by the even more amazing over-all growth of the Japanese economy. For several years now, mining and manufacturing have increased yearly by 20 to 30 per cent. Japan now leads the world in shipbuilding, has passed Britain in steel production and is narrowing the gap with West Germany. The introduction of foreign—mostly American—technology has raised the efficiency of Japanese industry and the quality of its product. Honda motorcycles and Sony electronic equipment, both products of recently established firms, have gained world-wide renown and Japanese department stores are being opened in the United States. Japan is in 1962 the world's fourth-ranking industrial power. Its growth rate last year was about 13 per cent—several times that of the United States.²

The resulting prosperity has not benefited every Japanese equally; even in the cities there remains some real poverty, especially among the employees of smaller firms, among unskilled workers and among day laborers. But much of the economic gain has percolated down to the working people, partly because they are now better protected by labor unions, social legislation and insurance, but also because the advanced character of Japan's post-war economy increasingly requires technical

¹ To illustrate this point: recent statistics show that 79.4 per cent of all urban households in Japan own a television set and that the figure for rural homes has already reached the impressive mark of 48.9 per cent and continues to grow rapidly.

² *Fortune*, last August, in its yearly survey of the 100 largest industrial companies (based on sales) outside the United States, listed six newcomers. Four of them were from Japan. The same survey showed that the sales increment of the Japanese firms had far outstripped that of their European competitors. Thus, the giant Hitachi company, known for its electric equipment, increased sales so rapidly despite tough international competition that it moved from the seventeenth place to the eleventh position among the non-American world's corporations.

skill, training and initiative rather than the drudgery of sweatshop labor. Sustained economic growth has also meant competition for efficient labor and consequently a rising wage level. In 1962, Japan is therefore the first non-Western nation to approach a Western standard of living, life expectancy and consumption. This is as yet not an affluent society, but its income per capita is already higher than that of Greece. The Japanese performance is all the more remarkable as it was achieved without the imposition of totalitarian economic or political controls, in a country that possesses only two resources: manpower and brains.

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, ex-bureaucrat and financial expert, upon coming to power in July, 1960, coined the slogan, "doubling the GNP and real income by 1970." *Baizo* (doubling) at once became one of the most popular words in the Japanese vocabulary. But only a year later Ikeda's ten-year plan had run into difficulties, not because of underfulfillment of production targets, but because the economy was out-racing the plan to such an extent that like a racing car under stress it was "overheating," as the Japanese termed it. Domestic consumption had grown too fast, inflationary pressures were making themselves felt, and, more serious, imports had far outstripped exports and foreign currency reserves were dwindling at a disturbing pace.

To save the situation, the government was compelled to slow down the boom. At present therefore Japan is going through a period of readjustment, characterized by a tight money policy, a cutback on imports and capital investment, a holding down of the growth rate to a relatively modest 4.5 per cent for fiscal 1962 and various measures aimed at boosting exports to re-establish some kind of balance in the international payments column.

The promotion of exports is obviously central to continued Japanese economic growth. In 1959, Japan's exports had increased by more than 20 per cent. The following year the figure stood at an impressive 17 per cent, but in 1961 exports rose less than 5 per cent. This year, the Japanese government expects

to boost the figure back to a healthy 15 per cent increase, but the pressing need to increase sales abroad occurs at a most unfavorable time.

In the past years Japan has been gradually opening its domestic market to foreign goods, removing little by little existing import controls on the assumption that Japanese trade would gain from a free flow of trade. Until recently this policy worked well: as Japan liberalized its imports, discriminatory treatment against Japanese exports slowly diminished and Japanese sales rose accordingly. But now the Japanese government must implement an earlier promise to the International Monetary Fund to free by the fall of 1962 all but 10 per cent of its imports from controls—and this coincides with a moment when, short of foreign currency, Japan must seek to balance its international payments. Japan thus faces a dilemma: to go back on the earlier promise or delay its implementation may have serious repercussions abroad where Japanese business is still confronted with a variety of restrictive barriers. To break down these barriers and to develop a favorable international environment for an expansion of Japanese trade is today the principal mission of Japanese foreign policy and a key consideration governing Japan's international relations.

JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since the economic factor is basic to Japan's international orientation, economic questions loom very large in Japan's relations with its principal ally, the United States, and with the rest of the world.

Trade between the United States and Japan has steadily grown to the point where the United States today is far and away the largest purchaser of Japanese goods and Japan ranks second only to Canada among United States customers. While these economic ties have cemented a feeling of interdependence among the two nations, the substantial deficit of Japan's American trade (\$500 million a year on the average) is of serious concern to the Japanese government. This is particularly so since vigorous Japa-

nese export promotion campaigns in the United States have in many cases (textiles, flatware, transistors, for example) given rise to American boycotts or import restrictions. In some instances American pressure has compelled Japan to adopt voluntary export controls. Recent "Ship American" and "Buy American" policies have also caused resentment and frustration in Japan especially since the industries most affected—fertilizer and steel—are among Japan's key industries and wield important political influence.

It is true that on the whole the United States has shown an awareness of Japan's need for foreign trade, but not necessarily for its desire to balance its American account. The two basic problems in United States-Japanese economic relations thus remain: Japan's heavy dependence on the United States market and the large scale of its unfavorable balance with the United States. This situation compels Japan to attempt to diversify its international trade and to scour the world for new markets. Sometimes these efforts lead to rivalry with American economic interests. At other times, as in the case of trade with the Communist bloc, they tend to conflict with the requirements of United States world-wide strategy and with the basic orientation of Japan's foreign policy.

The emergence of regional economic blocs, above all the European Common Market, is of special concern to Japan where the fear is often expressed that Japan may become an "economic orphan."³

Logically, Japan is also turning in the direction of South and Southeast Asia where many Japanese have traditionally seen a great future for Japan. Although the area is already one of Japan's two principal markets (accounting, as does the United States, for

somewhere between one-quarter and one-third of Japan's total trade), Tokyo's enthusiasm for an Asian Common Market has recently cooled considerably. It is realized in Tokyo that this region has indeed great potential, but cannot now provide an answer to Japan's immediate economic problems and pressures.

Nevertheless, long-range Japanese diplomatic and economic efforts in the area are going ahead: Japan has started to pay reparations to the Asian victims of its Pacific War; is extending technical aid and credits to Asian countries; builds up systematically a network of business representatives and plans to create goodwill by dispatching a Japanese version of the peace corps. Heavy Japanese investment in Hong Kong, joint Japanese-Indian industrial ventures, successful Japanese moves to share in the exploitation of Middle Eastern oil resources and export drives in Latin America and Africa attest to Japan's strenuous efforts to diversify its trade pattern and reduce its heavy dependence on the United States.

Recently the Communist bloc has figured increasingly in Japanese calculations although, apart from Japan's anti-Communist stand, there are various obstacles to the expansion of trade with the Communist countries: Japan's adherence to the free world embargo against the export of strategic goods to the Bloc, the absence of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union due to unresolved territorial problems, friendly relations with the Republic of China and the absence of any official ties with Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea.

Yet Japanese businessmen under the benevolent eyes of their government have been responding favorably to recent Communist economic overtures. To date, trade with Peking remains small, largely because of China's weak economic position and political intransigence. Economic exchanges with the U.S.S.R., however, have grown substantially. As Anastas Mikoyan suggested in 1961 when opening a Soviet trade fair in Tokyo and as Nikita Khrushchev has repeatedly stressed, the Soviet Union can provide Japan with

³ That the Japanese government does not intend to ignore the problems posed by the European Common Market is evident from the current travel schedules of the Japanese leaders. This fall, Foreign Minister Ohira plans to visit Europe. In November, Prime Minister Ikeda himself will tour Europe, no doubt to lay the groundwork for closer Japanese ties with the Common Market. Significantly, two important rival candidates for the prime ministership, Eisaku Sato and Aiichiro Fujiyama, also expect to study the issue on the spot before the end of this year.

large amounts of oil (competing with American oil exports) and lumber. It could also extend to Japanese businessmen an invitation to participate in the economic development of Siberia—one of prewar Japan's most cherished dreams.⁴

Percentage-wise, Japanese trade with the Communist bloc amounted in 1961 to a mere 3.2 per cent of Japan's total trade. Even so, this was a 61 per cent increase over the preceding year and represented \$320 million.⁵ How far this trade will grow in the future will depend primarily on the terms the Bloc offers—particularly on its willingness to abandon demands for long-term credits, deferred payment and requests for goods on the free world's embargo list. Its dimensions will also be influenced by the Japanese government's success in separating economic dealings with the Bloc from politics and by its estimate of the risk that expanded exchanges with the Communist countries might harm Japan's relations with the United States. However, Japanese eagerness to develop this trade should result in a gradual increase of Japanese trade with the Communist bloc at least so long as the international climate does not change substantially. Figures for part of 1962 bear out this estimate.

The desirability of expanding trade in all

⁴ Attracted mostly by such promises the largest Japanese trade mission ever to go abroad visited the U.S.S.R. and surveyed Siberia in the summer of 1962. It returned after having been received by Khrushchev with high hopes as well as with a \$100 million contract for the construction of ships.

⁵ \$210 million for trade with the U.S.S.R., \$48 million for China. The East European countries, North Vietnam and North Korea account for the remainder.

⁶ The parliamentary strength of the various parties in the fall of 1962 was as follows. *House of Representatives* (467 seats): L.D.P.—296, J.S.P.—143, D.S.P.—15, J.C.P.—3, Independents—2 (vacancies—8). *House of Councillors* (250 seats): L.D.P.—143, J.S.P.—66, D.S.P.—11, J.C.P.—4, Soka Gakkai—15, Independents—11. The Soka Gakkai is a comparative newcomer to the political scene and has grown in strength in recent years. It is a highly disciplined, militantly religious group associated with the nationalist and evangelistic brand of Nichiren Buddhism. It draws its support from among the underprivileged where it competes with the Communists and the Socialists. However, the group has no clear political program. Much of the time it votes with the L.D.P., but it opposes, as do the "progressives," any revision of the Constitution and stands in opposition to nuclear testing.

directions including that of the Communist bloc is one of the few points on which most Japanese see eye to eye. On virtually every other issue of foreign policy Japan appears deeply divided.

JAPAN DIVIDED

On one side are the conservatives, today unified in the Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.) supported by one-half to two-thirds of the electorate, who have been in power ever since Japan regained independence. On the other side stand the self-styled "progressives," a permanent opposition, composed of the Marxist and radical leftist Japan Socialist Party (J.S.P.) and the Japan Communist Party (J.C.P.). Nominally, at least, the progressive camp which represents about one-third of the electorate includes also the small Democratic Socialist Party (D.S.P.) established in 1960 by right wing J.S.P. members whose philosophy is close to that of the European social democrats. There are also a few (mostly conservative) independents in both houses of the Japanese Diet.⁶

During the past decade, the Japanese Communists have never succeeded in garnering more than four per cent of the popular vote. Although their strength has recently increased somewhat, it is clear that their importance lies rather in extra-parliamentary activity and in their ability to stir up the intellectuals and the Socialists. The social democratic D.S.P., on the other hand, is desperately fighting for survival between the conservatives and the radical socialists. Its failure to enlist popular support points to the Japanese preference for black-white positions and to the immaturity of the electorate which tends to confuse a pragmatic approach and moderation with a lack of decisiveness. Since neither the Communists nor the Democratic Socialists are likely to make much headway in the near future, Japan's stability and political future for the time being hinge on the L.D.P.-J.S.P. confrontation.

The L.D.P. supports the alliance with the free world in general and the United States in particular; recognizes the need for the military presence of the United States in

Japan and Okinawa; tends to favor a revision of the "Peace Constitution" to permit more flexibility with regard to rearmament; favors normalization of relations with the South Korean military regime; rejects a peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. so long as Japan's territorial claims have not been met; and goes along with the United States policy of non-recognition of the Peking regime.

The J.S.P., on the contrary, advocates "positive neutralism" for Japan and opposes violently the United States alliance, American bases in the area, a revision of the Constitution and rearmament; agitates against relations with the South Korean regime; favors conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union even at a price; and presses for friendly relations, including diplomatic ties, with Peking.

A wide gulf therefore separates the Japanese conservatives from the opposition Socialists. At first glance, nothing in 1962 would seem to have changed since 1960 when tens of thousands rioted in Tokyo's streets against the Kishi government and the revised security pact with the United States. But to reach such a conclusion would be to oversimplify the issue and to ignore some subtle changes.

The L.D.P. has long been an alliance of interest groups gathered around competing factional leaders holding views that range from conservative to reactionary. This trait, together with the Party's heavy reliance on funds from economic pressure groups, its willingness to let itself be manipulated from behind the scenes, and its lack of a political philosophy have alienated most of Japan's intellectuals and much of Japan's youth. If the L.D.P. has been able to retain a (dwindling) majority, it has been due to the conservative character of the Japanese rural electorate, continued prosperity, and the lack of imaginative and realistic leadership on the part of L.D.P.'s opponents.

POLITICAL CHANGE

Today, the Liberal Democrats are becoming aware of their weaknesses. They are attempting to revitalize their party and to broaden its appeal, to reduce its dependence

on special interest groups, to combat internecine power struggles, to reduce the authoritarian and feudal features of the organization. In short, they are seeking to project the image of a modern political party. The party leaders, making concessions to the age they live in and to the new generation, seem to have evolved a philosophy that while conservative encompasses also the concept of the welfare state. As the government becomes more responsive to the demands of the times, as it implements its plans and thereby reduces inequality and social tensions, it contributes to Japan's stability and forces its opponents, the Socialists, to reexamine their Marxist dogmatism and to descend from their lofty theoretical positions to the realm of reality.

Mao Tse-tung is said to have called the Japanese Socialist Party a "peculiar party." It is difficult to disagree with him when one thinks of a party that speaks of neutralism, but (despite Hungary and Tibet) has consistently identified Communist bloc policy with "anti-imperialism" and "peace," that in the face of a rising standard of living has accused "American imperialism" of exploiting the Japanese people, that has professed to draw a line against the Communists but has marched side by side with them and worked alongside them in many organizations, that has in the past missed no opportunity for violent criticism of free world policy (such as United States nuclear testing), yet has remained strangely silent about the failings of the Communist bloc, and that in 1959 unhesitatingly subscribed to Peking's dictum that "American imperialism is the common enemy of the Chinese and the Japanese peoples."

This is not the place to analyze the reasons for the behavior that has characterized the Japanese Socialists in the past. These stereotypes continue today in the minds of most Socialist leaders, but there are also symptoms of a sobering up, of doubts about Marxian orthodoxy, of a more realistic appraisal of the domestic and international situation, and of a changing strategy.

At the Eighth World Congress against A and H Bombs, held in Tokyo in August,

1962, Japanese Socialists for the first time dared openly to challenge the representatives of Peking who had been endorsing Soviet nuclear testing. And the Socialists have since repeated their criticism of Chinese belligerency and interference in Japanese affairs. The leadership of the J.S.P. is presently in the hands of men of relatively moderate and pragmatic outlook. They have criticized the strategy of revolutionary challenge to the existing order; they favor "structural reform." The meaning of this term is somewhat clouded (its theoretical origin appears to stem from the Italian Communist leader, Togliatti), but in practice it has meant the drawing of plans for specific reforms, i.e. revolutionary change within the framework of existing conditions. In a sense, the new policy may be termed one of greater realism. The same trend is evidenced in *Sohyo*, Japan's largest labor federation and the political and financial pillar of the J.S.P., which appears to have turned its attention from political demonstrations to economic issues. Even the radical Teachers Union is de-emphasizing its role in politics.

U.S. POLICY

Recent American policy has also contributed to the re-education of the Japanese Socialists and to an easing of tensions. American policy has consciously aimed at broadening contacts with the Japanese people; it has increased their understanding of America and the rationale behind our foreign policies. Our new Ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer, a specialist on Japan and an intellectual, has been able to establish some rapport with Japan's disaffected intellectuals; he has at least confronted them with intelligent arguments that tend to break down their stereotypes. The visit of United States Attorney-General Robert Kennedy earlier this year and the meeting of five United States cabinet members with their counterparts in Japan (November, 1961) have vividly illustrated American interest and concern. Our readiness to take into account Japan's sensitivity to military and nuclear matters and our willingness to discuss closer cooperation with

Japan in Okinawan affairs have eased some of the Japanese government's political difficulties and have removed elements of friction from the United States-Japanese military alliance. Our policy to reach out to the opposition forces, to invite labor leaders and intellectuals of the left, has helped to correct misunderstandings about our policy and to dispel the impression that the United States government is wedded to the Japanese conservatives.

WHAT FUTURE?

Will the Japanese conservatives continue to move in the direction of progress and modernization? Will the present trend toward greater realism and moderation among the Japanese Socialists be lasting and strong enough to reshape their nineteenth century view of the world? Will the Japanese people be able to solve their problems gradually, peacefully and without foreign interference? Will their growing power continue to bolster the free world's position? It would be foolhardy to venture answers to these questions beyond the immediate future, because Japan's destiny is so intimately tied up with decisions beyond its control. Still, at least as far as the near future is concerned, a certain optimism is justified. In retrospect, it would seem that the riots of 1960 were not a portent of revolution, as Peking had hoped, but rather they marked the end of a period of severe growing pains.

Paul F. Langer is on the staff of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and lectures at the University of Southern California. He was educated at Paris, Berlin, Tokyo and Columbia Universities and has served as consultant to numerous research and training organizations. He has written extensively in this country, in Europe and in Japan on Far Far Eastern problems. His most recent publication is "Moscow, Peking, and Tokyo: Views and Approaches" in *Unity and Contradiction—Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962).

Re-examining United States policies in the Far East, this author finds that "there is much evidence that policy toward Red China will have to be altered and that the time is at hand for the Administration, in its campaign phrase, to question the obvious and review the past."

The United States and China

By J. CHAL VINSON

Professor of History, University of Georgia

WHILE there has been much talk of an American foreign policy based on "maximum maneuverability," the direction of China policy over the last two years seems still governed by the conflicting theory of "maximum rigidity." To date the Kennedy administration has found no new answer to the problem of Communist China and has not altered John Foster Dulles' four point legacy of nonrecognition, exclusion from the United Nations, protection for Formosa and the offshore islands, and containment by pressure from Korea, Formosa and Southeast Asia. Change in policy by direct American initiative does not seem to be contemplated. Change, of course, may be forced by external events, a not remote possibility. Chiang Kai-shek is old and ill; Mao Tse-tung may soon retire; Red China, its "great leap forward" foiled by famine and failure, may face riots and revolution. Meanwhile America's China policy remains immobilized in the prison of history.

During its first 18 months the Kennedy administration has endorsed Dulles' program. This was not entirely expected. Although Secretary of State Dean Rusk asserted when taking office that one administration could expect to change only about 10 to 15 per cent of its predecessors' policies, John Kennedy, as a senator and as a presidential candidate, had been critical of Republican Far Eastern policy. As to seating Red China in the United Nations, he had proposed in 1959 that the

United States demonstrate its willingness to talk to Red China about the issue and "set forth conditions of recognition which seem responsible to a watching world." The President announced in October, 1961, however, that the United States "firmly opposes the entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations."

The American United Nation delegation, following this line, remained firm although it despaired of winning a vote to keep the issue from debate, as has been done each year since 1950. Parliamentary tactics were made ready to delay as long as possible the final seating of the Red Chinese. One called for the appointment of a committee to study the issue for a year, another was to raise the argument that a two-thirds rather than a simple majority would be required to seat the Peking government.

In one of the great surprises of the United Nations session, the Assembly in December, 1961, voted, 48 to 37, against the Soviet draft resolution to seat Red China. The immediate crisis passed, but if the 37 votes cast for the resolution in 1961 were augmented by the 19 countries that abstained from voting at that time, the Communists could in 1962 inflict on the United States an embarrassing defeat.

The third point of the Dulles program, the protection of Formosa and the offshore islands, was underwritten in July, 1962, when the Peking government forced the issue by concentrating 400,000 troops, 300 fighter

planes, and 1,400 pieces of artillery in the area opposite Quemoy and Matsu. Civilians were moved 600 miles inshore. Foreign Minister Chen Yi asserted that "should the United States persist in using the Chiang Kai-shek gang to impose war on the Chinese people the Chinese people have no alternative but to go along with it to the end." President Kennedy then declared that his policy would "be that established seven years ago under the Formosa resolution. . . . There must be no doubt that our policy, specifically including our readiness to take necessary action in the face of force, remains just what it has been since 1955."

At the same time United States Ambassador George Cabot at Warsaw, Poland, told Red Chinese representatives that the United States would defend Formosa but would not support a Nationalist mainland invasion. The present administration, therefore, seeks to maintain peace in the Formosa strait, a middle of the road policy that will keep Mao and Chiang shouting but not shooting at each other.

The United States' steady build-up of conventional armed forces in 1961-1962, the training of guerrilla forces, and stepped-up military aid in Vietnam further accent adherence to the Dulles principle that because Communist strategy is based on contiguous land mass it should be confronted by free world unity based upon "the peninsular positions and the offshore island chain now controlled by the free people of Asia." Under Secretary of State George W. Ball thus explained in July, 1962: "One does not have to accept fully the automatic operation of the so-called domino theory to recognize the strategic significance of South Viet Nam." Like Dulles before him, Ball concluded that the fall of Vietnam to communism would "be a loss of tragic significance to free world interests in the whole of Asia and the South Pacific." Secretary Rusk averred: "It will not be allowed to succeed."

THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

The firm policy on Quemoy and Matsu reflected the national consensus, ringingly re-

iterated by Rusk in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 13, 1962: "This nation seeks to show its adversaries that any resort to force would be not only unprofitable but dangerous." Yet where the offshore islands are concerned, the ground chosen for affirmation of steadfastness appears, at least to many observers, to represent no national interest worth the grave risk involved.

When the present policy was instituted in 1955, the offshore islands were of little intrinsic interest to American voters. Only ten per cent knew who owned them at the very moment Congress, by almost unanimous vote, (85-3 in the Senate; 409-3 in the House) gave the President unprecedented power to commit the nation's total military resources to their defense. At the time the United States commitment was reaffirmed in 1958, there were many dissenting voices. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson denounced a policy of drifting into war against China without friends or allies "over issues . . . which are not worth a single American life." Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Theodore Green saw no link between the offshore islands and Formosa and no sense in continuing a policy that attracted almost no allies.

The collapse of the Red Chinese economy over the last three years has freighted the offshore island issue with more potential danger and possible disaster than in 1958. Charges of an impending Nationalist push against the mainland augmented by the United States have fed the Red propaganda mills during the summer of 1962 to divert some attention from famine and frustration at home. Far more important is the fact that domestic discontent could force Red leaders into a suicidal charge against the offshore islands, dictated by desperation rather than logic and possibly representative only of a dissident faction in the government. This would force the United States to honor its commitment at no advantage to its over-all policies.

Maintaining the status quo toward China is dangerous, but it is not difficult to find explanations for administration immobility.

The major proportions of the 1961 Berlin crisis with the mobilization of many reserve units heightened the atmosphere of tension in which any move that appeared to indicate a weakening of will or relaxing of resolution could be ill afforded. A military commander finding what appeared to be an advanced position of strength endangered by encirclement can fall back to a safer position without being accused by his rank and file of selling out to the enemy. A President is less fortunate. A wise decision to abandon an untenable diplomatic position for one more defensible may cost him the popular confidence and support essential to continuing leadership. Unfortunately a majority of Americans, consciously or not, have accepted the offshore islands as a point of strength from which to challenge communism. Instead in fact they constitute an Achilles heel.

Change is difficult, too, for China policy is a prime example of the natural inflexibility of the American political system which, in the apt words of Senator Kennedy in 1957, "seeks too often to substitute slogans for solutions, which at times has even taken pride in the timidity of its ideas." What *The New York Times'* Max Frankel describes as "the almost mystical dream of eventual return to the mainland," by Chiang is a military impossibility but still a political force in the United States. Much political capital was made in the elections of 1952 and 1956 out of the charge that treason and ineptitude by the Democrats were the only causes for the needless "loss of China" in the late 1940's. Congress believes the public demands continuation of the rigid anti-Red China policy of the last decade with concession evidencing treason rather than wisdom. Indeed, policy had become such a plaything of domestic politics by 1958 that reporter James Reston asked: Will "we have to fight 600,000,000 Chinese to demonstrate that the Republicans are tougher on the Communists than the Democrats?"

THE ROLE OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

American Far Eastern policy remains rigid because it is tied, not to a nation, the Nationalist Chinese, but to a man, Chiang Kai-shek.

His interests rather than American interests largely determine the policy we follow. It would seem that Americans who periodically protest that American policy is being made by the United Nations should reject this dictatorship by the old man of Grass Mountain. Yet such are the vagaries of public reaction that Chiang, not entirely by chance, symbolizes the possibility of making good the American dream of two decades ago—"a strong, free, and democratic China," self-sustaining and buttressing American policy in the Far East.

With the ledgermain of some leaders, Chiang, in the eyes of many Americans, is somehow able to escape responsibility for the failures of his regime. He was still asserting in late 1962 that the "nearest future" would bring "revolution on the mainland and the holy expedition to save our people." So long as Chiang's roseate view of his political future holds the American public mind, a fundamental change in American policy toward Nationalist China will be bad politics in the United States.

So, for example, the dozen congressional members of the Republican Policy Committee, June 7, 1962, publicly affirmed: "The bandit leaders of Red China should neither be admitted to the UN nor recognized by the United States." Decrying government by "arm-chair policy-makers," they called for victory through a policy of "high-powered deeds, not high-sounding words." This zeal has not been entirely partisan. Since 1951, Congress has ten times passed resolutions against seating Red China in the United Nations. The resolution failed to gain unanimous endorsement only in 1959, when two House members opposed it. When a presidential adviser, in recommendations for long-range foreign and defense policy, indicated that communism and the free world have areas of "overlapping interests" and used the word "mellowing" in describing American attitudes toward the Soviet Union in 1962, there was an immediate investigation by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The proposal for a Freedom Academy, a school for diplomats similar to the military academies, was damned

both by conservatives who feared it would be a hot bed of pro-Communists and by liberals who predicted it would be the plaything of far right wing conservative anti-Communists. In August, 1962, Secretary Rusk was moved to assert publicly that the administration was not, as its rightist critics carped, following a "no win" policy. "We intend to win and we are going to win. Our objective is a victory for all mankind."

Change in China policy was made less propitious politically in the summer of 1962 by events that appeared to strengthen John Foster Dulles' theory that communism in China is "a passing and not a perpetual phase" and Kennedy's frequent assertion, before and after becoming President, that "in the long run there will be sufficient evolutionary changes in the Communistic system in Russia as well as in China to give us some hope of success."

Press sources were agreed that Red China's economic breakdown in 1962 was serious, possibly the most important event in a decade, and that it stemmed from the failure of the Red clique's "great leap forward" launched in 1958. "Peking's search for a breakthrough resulted in a breakdown." But exact information was impossible to filter from propaganda; there was no agreement as to the possible results of this breakdown.

Richard Hughes wrote in *The New York Times Magazine* of June 3, 1962, that none of the 70,000 refugees who fled to Hong Kong in May had asked to be sent to Formosa or shown any interest in Chiang's government. They were looking for jobs and security; they were not escaping from communism; they did not talk of revolt.

A major about-face has been made by the Communist government. The commune system of forced agricultural labor is being abandoned and regulations in other areas have been relaxed. Discontent is widespread but Hughes felt that "It would be folly to expect real peril for the Peiping regime." Present changes are nothing more than a stage in "expedient retreat, a period of planned readjustment. . . . Peiping's grip on the throat of an unhappy but powerless nation

is unshaken." Other observers noted that the five or six hundred refugees pouring into Hong Kong each day in August and September did not include any soldiers. "The people," *Newsweek* reported, "resent the regime's bungling, but they are not about to explode." Two years of good crops could bring production back to a high level, restore the economy and silence political discontent.

Yet there was room for speculation that the regime might be on shaky ground. There was, of course, no guarantee that harvests for the next two years would be better than those for the last three. Efforts to change agricultural methods overnight have in many instances drastically reduced the productivity of the land. Joseph Alsop suggested that for a nation estimated to have a minimal living standard in 1958, 1,800 calories a day for manual laborers, three years of crop failures must have reduced a vast majority of workers to a level of creeping starvation. While able to sustain life, they would not be physically able to do the work required to advance the economy. Even the iron hand of Communist discipline, Alsop thought, could not hold down indefinitely a people driven to desperation through hunger.

POPULATION PRESSURE

There was general agreement that Red bureaucratic bungling had compounded natural disasters by attempting too rapid an economic development and that rapid population growth probably was the fundamental problem in Red China. The first scientific census taken in November, 1954, showed 600 million rather than the estimated 450 million population. With the growth rate figured even at a minimum of two per cent this projected a 700 million population by 1961 and one billion by 1980.

After an eight month program of birth control in 1957-1958 in defiance of Communist dogma Mao decided that limiting the population was an admission that native resourcefulness and all-wise socialism had failed. Controls were relaxed with the statement in August, 1958, that "there will never be enough people." China then entered on the "Great

Leap Forward"—designed to make China the economic equal of Britain in 15 years and provide for an unlimited population. "As man had two hands and only one mouth, production must always surpass consumption," argued one Communist sage. China's population explosion was proclaimed to be a decisive political and military weapon against the free world. Out of this thinking came the statement, attributed to both Mao and Tito, that China did not fear atomic war. Even if half of the population was wiped out there would remain another 300 million.

Now, four years later, Mao is discovering that the 14 million annual population increase is a source of weakness if starving and desperate people conclude the Red bureaucracy is responsible for their plight.

While the Kennedy administration's posture toward Red China is that of its predecessor, it must be pointed out that the Administration's approach to military implementation of general policy has altered radically. Emphasizing the need in each crisis for control, flexibility and choice, the Kennedy administration has abandoned the rule of thumb that nuclear weapons will automatically be employed in any conflict bigger than "brush fire war." The reduction of conventional forces which grew out of that rule has also been abandoned. By the spring of 1962, the Army had been increased from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions and all non-nuclear fighting power had been strengthened. Special emphasis had been given to rapid expansion of the guerrilla and anti-guerrilla training programs, especially important in containing Communist advances along the borders of Red China. As a consequence, the highly dangerous and largely ineffective threat of immediate atomic retaliation in Asia is being supplemented by creating guerrilla forces capable of checking forces effectively used by the Communists over the past decade.

In South Vietnam an American military mission of 700 men in 1961 was expanded by 1962 to a force of about 7,000 with promises of more to come. Whereas these men had worked at headquarters in the past they were now going directly into the field.

Troop commitments in Thailand were rapidly increased to 5,000 men when Thailand was threatened by the troubles in Laos. Other American forces in Southeast Asia, in June, 1962, were estimated at 5,000 in Taiwan, 57,000 in South Korea, 50,000 in Japan, 40,000 in Okinawa, and 10,000 in the Philippines.

NEED FOR NEW POLICY

Policy in its most popular sense—a panacea which will produce instant solutions—is no more possible toward Red China than it is elsewhere. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that policy toward Red China will have to be altered and that the time is at hand for the Administration, in its campaign phrase, to question the obvious and review the past. No doubt this is being done, but little has been done to define new positions or lead the public toward them. Where China's policy is concerned, there seems to be much truth in James Reston's complaint that President Kennedy refuses to grapple with the philosophic and educational responsibilities of his office; that his is an administration "of intelligent educators who will not educate."

The "choice" which the President wants in time of crisis must include a degree of public faith and understanding ready to follow a new lead should informed experts determine upon it. Change in policy is hard to bring about; the strongest thing in government is the momentum of established programs. But that fact should be recalled along with George F. Kennan's warning: "A nation which excuses its own failures by the sacred untouchableness of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster."

J. Chal Vinson was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1957-1958. His books include *The Parchment Peace*; *William E. Borah and the Outlawry of War*; and *Referendum for Isolation*. He also contributed the chapter on C. E. Hughes to *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*.

In a survey of instability in the Indochinese peninsula, this specialist examines Indochina's strategic value for the United States. "By late 1962," he writes, "the American stake on the Southeast Asian mainland has become gradually reduced to the stark question, whether there is going to be a Western foothold of any kind at all in the area or whether it is going to be completely abandoned to Communist hegemony."

Southeast Asia: The West at Bay

By BERNARD B. FALL

Professor of International Relations, Howard University

IT is too early to point to a precise date which might serve as a milestone for the decline of the West's power in Southeast Asia. Some observers point to the Anglo-American defeats of Singapore and Corregidor of 1942 as a landmark similar to the loss of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. Others point to the French defeat at Dienbienphu in May, 1954, as being such a point in history which marks the end of an era.

Dienbienphu was much more than a lost military engagement and even more than simply the death knell of French colonialism in Asia. Just as Singapore and Corregidor showed that a non-Western nation could defeat Western nations with their own type of weaponry, Dienbienphu showed that a *revolutionary warfare* force could defeat on the open field of battle a far better equipped con-

ventional force. In Korea, a conventional Communist force had been checkmated by likewise conventional American, Korean, and United Nations troops; Dienbienphu showed the way to Communist victories elsewhere, beyond the twin deadlocks of conventional war and nuclear war.

The Geneva cease-fire conference which followed the Indochinese débâcle left the map of Southeast Asia drastically changed. North Vietnam down to the seventeenth parallel became the regroupment area for the Vietminh forces of Ho Chi Minh and blossomed into a full-fledged Communist state. South Vietnam, racked by administrative disintegration, feudal sects, and the sudden influx of 860,000 refugees from the soon-to-be Communist areas, seemed moribund.¹ Laos, twice almost overrun by Vietminh invasions,² was in no position to resist Communist demands for a regroupment area made up of the two northern provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua with a connecting corridor between them, in which a Communist-dominated administration under Prince Souphanouvong maintained full control and an embryo of an autonomous armed force.

Only Cambodia, endowed more by luck than design with an able leadership under the authority of its king (now Prince) Norodom Sihanouk, was able to maintain both its in-

¹ For a balanced study of South Vietnam during the early post-1954 period, see John W. Lindholm, ed., *Vietnam—The First Five Years*, East Lansing, Michigan University Press, 1960.

² In January–May, 1953, Communist Vietnamese Divisions Nos. 308, 312 and 316 stabbed via Samneua at Xieng-Khouang and Luang Prabang, while Division 304 attacked the *Plaine des Jarres* hedgehog position. In December, 1953–April, 1954, Divisions 304, 308 and 312 attacked further north in the direction of Muong-Sai, while Divisions 304 and 325, in a daring 400-mile raid through mountains and jungle, cut Indochina in two on Christmas Day, 1953, wiped out nearly all French positions in southern Laos, and laid siege to the northern Cambodian towns of Voeune Sai and Siempang.

dependence and unity. Sihanouk had succeeded in disentangling himself from the French colonial administration—thus avoiding the stigma of being branded as a “French puppet” like his Vietnamese neighbor, Bao-Dai—and in showing a great deal of courage in standing up to the great powers at Geneva in 1954 when the latter were ready to carve up Cambodia like the other two states of Indochina in order to provide for a Communist regroupment area.

In a diplomatic rearguard battle that no doubt will remain a classic in diplomatic annals, the Cambodian delegation fought for almost seven hours on July 20, 1954, to save the unity of its country. Finally, at 3:43 A.M. of July 21, our Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov yielded to the Cambodian negotiators, who thus saved not only the unity of their country but also (and this is much too often forgotten these days) the right to maintain an American military mission on their soil.³

The creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato) in Manila on September 8, 1954, included the three non-Communist Indochina states under the “protective umbrella” clause of its Protocol, thus insuring them of a measure of external aid in case of renewed aggression. This move, along with the gradual improvement of the Western position in Malaya (where the Chinese terrorists had finally been driven into the deep woods) and the Philippines (where the reform administration of Ramon Magsaysay was taking hold) restored a certain favorable balance in Southeast Asia. That balance, however, was to prove precarious.

INTRA-AREA TENSIONS

The end of the Indochina war brought about the removal of the French as a political factor in Southeast Asia. When American aid payments began going directly to the Indochinese states as of January 1, 1955, and

the last French troops left Saigon in April, 1956, French influence in the area fell to its lowest point in 100 years. That disappearance of France also paved the way for the reopening of old wounds and the settling of old scores—and those came very soon. In fact, the very absence (at least for a short time) of direct Communist pressure made the reappearance of such local but violent disputes a more important factor than they would have been otherwise.

Most of those disputes dealt—and still do late in 1962—with the re-establishment of the *status quo ante* 1863, i.e., the date when the French colonial influence began to make itself felt throughout the peninsula. Prior to that date, the situation looked roughly as follows: in a series of successful wars fought during the latter part of the eighteenth century, Siam (now Thailand) had taken over much of the Laotian-held Korat plateau. In a last bitter war with the decaying kingdom of Vientiane in 1828, it had literally destroyed the little country and had put the whole Mekong valley south of Luang Prabang under its effective control. The southern Laotian principality of Champassak also became a Siamese protectorate—a situation which prevailed until the establishment of the French protectorate in 1893.

The Vietnamese emperors also had not remained idle. Several Vietnamese wars with the kings of Luang Prabang in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had brought the vitally located kingdom of the Tran-Ninh (which embodies the famous *Plaine des Jarres*) under Vietnamese control. This was followed by an actual protectorate as of 1831, in the course of which many Vietnamese moved across the mountain passes into Laos.

Neighboring Cambodia had suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Siamese and Vietnamese. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Cambodia was little more than a Siamo-Vietnamese condominium, whose kings had to secure the consent of both Bangkok and Hué, and Cambodian attempts at rebellion were ruthlessly put down. As of 1818, Cambodia, like Poland in Eur-

³ Cf. B. Fall, “Cambodia’s International Position,” *Current History*, March, 1961. See also Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, *Fin d’une guerre—Genève, 1954*, Paris, 1960: Editions du Seuil.

ope, had been completely split up into Siamese and Vietnamese provinces with colonial governors of the neighboring nations directly administering them and alien immigrants dispossessing the native Cambodians of their soil and even of the names of their cities.⁴ The boundary between the Siamese and Vietnamese zones of control ran roughly south of the Great Lake, with the capital of Oudong in Siamese hands and with Siamese army units holding the mountain uplands in today's Central Vietnam as far east as Kontum and Pleiku. Cambodian cities such as Stung Treng and Siempang were known as slave markets, where the Siamese bought and sold Cambodians and mountaineers as late as the 1850's.

Thus the arrival of the French constituted for both the Laotians and the Cambodians a last-minute respite from a fate that would have been by and large tantamount to total disappearance as a national entity; just as the United States in 1919 was largely responsible for the reappearance of Poland and Czechoslovakia as national units. And like the latter two states, Laos and Cambodia have been ever since in the uncomfortable buffer position between two far larger and far more dynamic neighbors. To put it in one simple sentence, the survival of Laos and Cambodia as independent states depends, regardless of the additional Communist threat, upon the willingness of one or several outside powers to assume responsibility for their protection against their stronger neighbors.

During 1960-1961, the failure of the United States to play this role in Laos⁵ has

resulted in a reassertion of North Vietnamese control over much of that country—a situation which, regardless of the Communist character of the Hanoi regime, any Vietnamese would consider “historically correct.” In the case of Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk late in 1962 actually seeks to obtain a similar guarantee against encroachments upon his country by America's Thai and South Vietnamese allies. Needless to say, the open promise of such a guarantee would add a certain strain to American relations with Thailand and South Vietnam. The Russians, not hemmed in by similar considerations, gave such a guarantee by backing a Cambodian request for a 14-nation conference to safeguard Cambodia's neutrality.⁶ On the Western side, the French also followed their own traditional policies as “re-creators” of Laos and Cambodia: President de Gaulle endorsed the idea of an international conference on Cambodian neutrality in a personal letter addressed to Prince Sihanouk early in September, 1962.

The question has often arisen as to whether the Cambodian leadership (e.g., Prince Sihanouk) is “too naive” to understand the reality of the Communist threat, in the face of which the encroachments of both Thailand and South Vietnam must be considered as decidedly minor. The reasoning of the Cambodians—and this includes, as far as is possible to judge, a great many outside the governing élite—is based on the stark facts of their history of the past 200 years. It was expressed to this writer by Prince Sihanouk several times during the past year and runs roughly as follows:

We are aware of, and concerned with, the threat which the Communist powers represent. However, it has been our observation that in the case of a Communist take-over, be it in Eastern Europe or in Asia, the national *entity* of the country thus taken over is preserved. The Poles are Poles and the Czechs are Czechs and are ostensibly governed by people of their own kind.

If we were to be swallowed up by the Thai and the Vietnamese tomorrow, we would purely and simply disappear as a *people*, not to speak of Cambodia as a national unit, just as the king-

⁴ It is noteworthy of the Orwellian type of history-writing that has been the fashion with regard to Cambodia that Joseph Buttinger's massive *Smaller Dragon* (New York, 1958: Praeger), which is a political history of Vietnam, completely fails to mention Vietnamese colonialism in Cambodia. Saigon (formerly Prey-Nokor) became Vietnamese only in 1698, and the Camau Peninsula only in 1757. The Cambodians—over 500,000—who still live there, are one of the sources of insecurity in some areas of Vietnam today.

⁵ Cf. Fall, “Reappraisal in Laos,” *Current History*, January, 1962.

⁶ *Pravda*, Moscow, August 28, 1962.

dom of Champa⁷ has disappeared; and would become anonymous provinces of our neighbors. Within a generation, even our language and culture would be wiped out and there would be no more Cambodians.

It is not important whether or not Thailand or South Vietnam would *really* completely swallow up Cambodia or merely amputate several of its key provinces, although the leaders of both countries have made several statements to the effect that they desired such boundary changes. The essential point in the present situation is that Cambodia has a *real* fear of partition and that, in such circumstances, Communist domination must of necessity appear to it as an evil of less permanent a nature than genocide.

Here again, a comparison with Poland, with its long tragic tradition of being divided among its neighbors, is not without interest: under the Communist regime, Poland at least can maintain sufficient cultural and ethnic integrity to await perhaps an eventual liberalization of the bloc system. In the meantime, it survives as a national unit. Under the Nazi administration, the Poles were purely and simply slated for extermination and Poland had disappeared (with Soviet help, let it be noted) as a national unit. When the alternatives become as crude as national subservience or genocide, the choice, unfortunately, becomes obvious.

⁷ Champa was a kingdom occupied by a Hinduized seafaring nation along the Vietnamese shoreline between the eighteenth and the eleventh parallels. The Chams were totally destroyed in 700 years of war by the conquering Vietnamese. There exist only about 20,000 Chams today in South Vietnam.

⁸ In recent months, the leader of the C.T.'s in Malaya, Chin Peng, spent a holiday in Bangkok and returned to his jungle stronghold without being apprehended. Chin Peng, originally trained by the British to fight the Japanese, received in 1946 the coveted O.B.E. (Order of the British Empire) for his wartime guerrilla activities.

⁹ According to an *Agence France-Presse* report released in Saigon on July 31, 1962, and passed by South Vietnamese censorship, the South Vietnamese forces lost during the first six months of 1962 a total of 2,588 weapons to the Communist guerrillas, while capturing only 2,148. While the ratio of captured to lost weapons improved since 1961, it still permits the Communists to resupply themselves largely out of South Vietnamese booty rather than through costly supply convoys from their North Vietnamese sanctuary, which are reserved to scarce heavy weapons and hard-to-get drugs.

This old quarrel has taken on increasing bitterness as internal stresses both in Thailand and South Vietnam make the existence of an external issue desirable to the rulers in Bangkok and Saigon. By late in 1962 it also has become a major factor in the relations between the United States and the three countries primarily concerned.

THE AMERICAN STAKE

The argument that none of the countries in the area is absolutely essential to American defense has relatively little impact on the over-all issue that the Communists apparently have found Southeast Asia a propitious battleground where they can demonstrate United States inability to stand up to the enormous stresses of revolutionary war. In the first round of that war, the American-supported French lost the battle. In Laos, General Phoumi Nosavan's overmotorized, overarmed and overpaid right-wing forces met one defeat after another in spite of lavish American aid and 800 military advisers. In Malaya, a hard core of 475 Chinese terrorist guerrillas still holds the field in the Thai-Malayan border area—no doubt on higher orders since it would have no trouble whatever in filtering across Thailand or Burma to South China.⁸ It ties up better than 100 times its own strength of Malay, British and Thai troops, thus fulfilling its disruptive task even in this quiescent theater.

In South Vietnam, less than 25,000 full-time guerrillas and infiltrated North Vietnamese regulars tie down more than 400,000 South Vietnamese soldiers and militiamen of various kinds, in addition to 10,000 American specialists recruited in many cases from the elite Special Forces. Here again, the 20-to-1 tie-down ratio of regulars versus guerrillas constitutes a heavy drain in scarce manpower (not to speak of the war's cost, which is currently set at \$1 million a day), at little expense to the Communist bloc.⁹

All this spells a real challenge to the United States and one which the United States has decided to face up to in South Vietnam, regardless of cost. In spite of the usual press statements northern Southeast

Asia has no direct military value: Laos really is not a "road" to anywhere, and it is not South Vietnam but Cambodia that shields the vulnerable parts of Thailand. But the "denial value" of the area is enormous: the neutralization of Laos and the difficulties in South Vietnam have renewed Thai fears of American disengagement to the point that certain Thai leaders (such as, in September, 1962, General Prapas Charusathien) have made statements which could well be construed as at least indicating an increased interest by Thailand in following a policy of non-commitment. The recent negotiations between Bangkok and Hanoi about further repatriation (without choice as to destination, let it be underlined) of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to Communist North Vietnam and increased Soviet trade with Thailand may be straws in the same wind.

With Southeast Asia no longer under American control, India's position would become well-nigh impossible. What Indonesia's attitude then would be is anybody's guess. In other words, the negative stake of denying the adversary access to further Southeast Asian real estate is truly an important one. It is the denial value of the area which inspires policy-makers in Washington to accept the battle on almost any terms, regardless of whether the Ngo Dinh Diem or any other regime is "popular" or not. In fact, the

present trend is to go so far as to say that popular support is not particularly relevant to the outcome of a guerrilla war.¹⁰

So far, experience has shown that popular support is a vital factor in revolutionary war, but this does not exclude the possibility of the discovery of radically new methods of counter-insurgency in which popular support can be replaced by technological or tactical innovations. In any case, both views are being put extensively to the test in South Vietnam today. Victory or defeat in that war, therefore, will influence the West's overall position in most underdeveloped areas where Communist-inspired revolutionary warfare is likely to challenge it.

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

One of the most interesting aspects of the present preoccupation with revolutionary warfare is the state of semantic confusion in which it has thrown everybody even remotely interested in the subject. The number of self-styled experts who suddenly are selling their services to the Government in that field, and of civilian agencies and branches of the Armed Services which suddenly develop "unconventional warfare capabilities" (and that includes almost everyone except perhaps the Women's Army Corps) is equally impressive. It involves, of necessity, much waste of effort, much duplication, and much laborious rediscovery of facts which the British and French, with their wide-ranging experience in that field, had lying around gathering dust in their file drawers for years. Thus, a few words of semantic clarification may be required in order to understand in full the Communist challenge in Southeast Asia.¹¹

Much has been said of late about "unconventional warfare," "special warfare," "guerrilla warfare," "insurgency," "political warfare," "national liberation wars," "bandit war,"—to name a few. All of them in one way or another succeed in conveying the idea of violence. Only one of them, political warfare, conveys the idea of a simultaneous non-military struggle; to the point, in fact, where the military facet of the term almost

¹⁰ Prof. W. W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, stated in June, 1961, in an address to the Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg: "In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the free world is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied [sic]. These are, at best, half-truths." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January, 1962, pp. 48-49.

The same point was made sometime later by Roger Hilsman, Director of the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department, in his preface to the American edition of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* (New York, Praeger, 1962): "Guerrillas do not need majority support from the entire countryside. They can operate effectively even if some of the populace is hostile and the rest indifferent."

¹¹ This writer discusses the whole problem more extensively in his forthcoming *Two Viet-Nams—Background of Conflict* (New York, Praeger, December, 1962).

disappears. In the view of this writer, only the expression *revolutionary warfare* gives full credit to both the military and dynamic political aspects of the struggle which we are facing.

The expression was originally used in its present meaning by Mao Tse-tung in his key study *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* first published in 1936. The French, who were first faced with the problem on a large scale, adopted the same term. It was a French professor at the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*, Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, who, in a book that is totally ignored in the United States, defined revolutionary war as "the application of guerrilla warfare methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system."¹² That definition does fully take cognizance of the essentially *political* use to which those guerrilla warfare methods are put when used by the Communists rather than by us.

On the Communist side, the military target is always chosen according to its political impact. On our side, the enemy revolutionary warfare fighter seems to be the major target, if not the only one. The military "kill" becomes the primary target—simply because the essential political target is too elusive for us, or worse, because we do not understand its importance. Intellectually, of course, this is realized at top level, as is evidenced by a remark made by President Kennedy to Stewart Alsop in a much-quoted interview in the *Saturday Evening Post*: "What they're doing at Fort Bragg [the Special Forces School] is really good, but, in the final analysis what is needed is a political effort."¹³

Yet at the operating level, the view seems still to be that all the Vietminh (or "Viet Cong," as the South Vietnamese call them)

¹² Bonnet, *Histoire des guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l'antiquité à nos jours*, Paris, 1958: Payot.

¹³ Stewart Alsop, "Kennedy's Grand Design," *S.E.P.*, March 31, 1962.

¹⁴ Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. xxv.

¹⁵ Truong Chinh, *La Résistance vaincra* (new ed.), Hanoi, 1960, p. 71.

¹⁶ *Newsweek*, September 10, 1962; *Harper's Magazine*, September, 1962.

use to maintain their control is sheer armed terror;¹⁴ and thus, that "counter-insurgency" or, *in fine*, counter-terror, will turn the tide against the adversary. That is wishful thinking at best. Mao Tse-tung himself warned against this in his previously mentioned book when he admonished his military commanders that they must be "*against guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, yet for its guerrilla character [italics in text].*"

What is being practiced right now on our side is "guerrilla-ism." Small-unit warfare is the rage; men are being trained for every contingency likely to arise in the jungle. But it is doubtful whether they (or anyone else on our side) can convince the Vietnamese peasant that the Communist program of land reform, neutralism and, above all, peace, is merely a propaganda ploy. The Vietnamese will have to do that explaining themselves; no one can do it for them. Here again, the Communist leaders are not loathe to prescribe the proper recipe. As early as September, 1947, Truong Chinh, the then secretary-general of the Vietnamese Communist party, warned of

... those who tend to rely on military action [alone and] believe everything can be settled by armed force. They don't mobilize politically. They are unwilling to give explanations and try to convince the people to side with them.¹⁵

Thus, the Communist challenge in Southeast Asia has yet to be faced on its *real* terrain: that of ideas, policies and down-to-earth effective administration. Thus far, that struggle seems to be limited to conventional "psychological warfare" operations whose over-use throughout the world has worn off their novelty on both sides, and to an attempt at whipping Western opinion into line by intimidating foreign journalists and professors.¹⁶ Neither tactics have been particularly successful.

In addition, there is always the ominous shadow of Communist North Vietnam behind whatever happens in the Indochinese peninsula. As this writer could see for himself during a visit there in July, 1962 (which included personal interviews with Ho Chi Minh and his prime minister, Pham Van

Dong), North Vietnam is likely to be a tough and determined "adversary-by-proxy" in what can in all honesty be called "The Second Indochina War."

CONCLUSION

As one surveys the situation in Southeast Asia in the fall of 1962, there are few evidences that the situation is clearly turning in the West's favor. Recent attempts by the United States to patch over intra-area disputes between Cambodia and her neighbors have unfortunately failed because of insufficient pressure on all concerned to come to reasonable terms, either through direct confrontation, mediation, or under United Nations auspices. This will only make Cambodia's case for a 14-power conference on the subject more pressing and the conference itself more unavoidable.

Much is often made of the "stability" of the governments in the area. The re-establishment of such stability, where it is said to be lacking, is being made a primary target of policy; and its achievement hailed as a major feat. In my view, the trouble with the Western position (and not only in Southeast Asia) has been, in fact, too much of that false stability which in many cases does little else but hide advanced governmental sclerosis. For almost six years, from 1954 until 1960, the Communists gave the West a breathing space in the area. Only now does it become clearly apparent how badly that time has been used, or rather misused.

In spite of lavish aid expenditures, none of the countries concerned achieved the Rostowian "takeoff" stage. In fact, it is doubtful whether they achieved pre-1939 living standards on a general country-wide basis.

In the underdeveloped areas of the world, and in Southeast Asia in particular, the Communists are riding the crest of a revolutionary wave which the peoples of those areas would have generated even without their presence. In the words of President Kennedy in his Special Message to Congress in May, 1961:

... They seek an end to injustice, tyranny and exploitation. More than an end, they seek a beginning.

And theirs is a revolution which we would support regardless of the Cold War, and regardless of which political or economic route they should choose to freedom.

Considering the present situation throughout the whole Indochinese peninsula, a more literal application of President Kennedy's exhortation might come closer to meeting the political requirements of the situation than anything else that is being done at this moment.

Bernard B. Fall is the author of several books and studies on Indochina, including *Le Viet-Minh* and *Street without Joy: Indochina at War*. He traveled in Southeast Asia in 1953, 1957 and 1959; he recently returned from the area after a year's study there under a Rockefeller Foundation research grant.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, JULY 2, 1946 AND JUNE 11, 1960 (74 STAT. 208) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION OF CURRENT HISTORY, published monthly at Philadelphia, Pa., for October 1962.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Penna.; Editor, Carol L. Thompson, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn.; Managing Editor, None; Business Manager, None. 2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) Current History, Inc., 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa.; Shelby Cul-lom Davis, 116 John Street, N. Y. 38, N. Y.; D. G. Redmond, Jr., 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Pa. The known bondholders, mortgages, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Pa. 4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholders or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner. 5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required by the act of June 11, 1960 to be included in all statements regardless of frequency of issue.) 17,513.

D. G. REDMOND, JR., Publisher

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of September, 1962 (Seal)

Mary K. O'Neill, Notary Public, Phila., Phila. Co. (My commission expires January 15, 1963.)

BOOK REVIEWS

PARTIES AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN. By ROBERT A. SCALAPINO and JUNNOSUKE MASUME. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. 153 pages and index, \$3.75.)

"The great historic problem of modern Japanese politics has been the high degree of separation between those formal political institutions borrowed from the West, and the much broader social institutions bred from within Japanese society. . . ." These Asian specialists analyze Japanese parties and current Japanese politics in the light of Japan's "historic problem." This is a valuable contribution to the subject.

COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE. By A. DOAK BARNETT. (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1962. 88 pages, \$2.95.)

This slender volume based on three lectures at Washington University sketches the problems facing both China and the rest of the world in the perspective of Chinese history. In 88 pages, the author can only touch the surface of his subject.

THAILAND. By ROBERT L. PENDLETON. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1962. 311 pages and index, \$10.00.)

With maps, diagrams, charts and photographs, this American Geographical Society Handbook—*Thailand, Aspects of Landscape and Life*—is based on writings of the late Robert Pendleton and is a very welcome contribution to the field of Thai geography and economics.

NOMADS AND COMMISSARS. Mongolia Revisted. By OWEN LATTIMORE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 221 pages, notes and index, \$5.75.)

This is a well-written account of Outer Mongolia today, by a traveler whose knowledge of the language and history of

the region illumines his description of "a wonderful people."

MY LAND AND MY PEOPLE. The Memoirs of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962. 234 pages, appendices and index, \$5.95.)

The autobiography of Tibet's Fourteenth Dalai Lama will interest students of the Far East both for the light it sheds on the religion and life of Tibet and for the charges of genocide made by the Dalai Lama against the Communist Chinese.

FOREIGN AID AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. By AMOS A. JORDAN, JR. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. 229 pages, glossary, notes, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

This is a scholarly study of Southeast Asian military defense, the problems of economic and military aid from the recipient's point of view and the difficulties faced by the United States in a massive aid program. Charts and tables help illustrate the case studies in this informative text.

THE COLD WAR: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT. By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. 99 pages and bibliography, \$3.50.)

The text of three lectures originally delivered at Louisiana State University, this essay on the Cold War is a forceful restatement of Frederick Schuman's views. Our greatest danger, he believes, is "a continuation and extension of international anarchy, of power politics, of war . . . in the thermonuclear age. . . ." He is aware of the obstacles facing both the United States and the U.S.S.R., but is hopeful that Russians and Americans alike will learn "the ultimate lesson that enduring peace in the world community requires effective law in the world community. . . ."

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Future of West New Guinea

On August 15, 1962, the Netherlands and Indonesia signed an agreement on the transfer of sovereignty of West New Guinea (West Irian to Indonesia). The complete text of this agreement follows:

The Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Having in mind the interests and welfare of the peoples of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) hereinafter referred to as "the territory,"

Desirous of settling their dispute regarding the territory,

Now, therefore, agree as follows:

RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ARTICLE I

After the present agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands has been signed and ratified by both contracting parties, Indonesia and the Netherlands will jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the General Assembly of the United Nations takes note of the present agreement, acknowledges the role conferred upon the Secretary General of the United Nations therein, and authorizes him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE II

After the adoption of the resolution referred to in Article I, the Netherlands will transfer administration of the territory to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (U.N.T.E.A.) established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General upon the arrival of the United Nations Ad-

ministrator appointed in accordance with Article IV. The U.N.T.E.A. will in turn transfer the administration to Indonesia in accordance with Article XII.

UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE III

In order to facilitate the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A. after the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly, the Netherlands will invite the Secretary General to send a representative to consult briefly with the Netherlands Governor of the territory prior to the latter's departure. The Netherlands Governor will depart prior to the arrival of the United Nations Administrator.

ARTICLE IV

A United Nations Administrator, acceptable to Indonesia and the Netherlands, will be appointed by the Secretary General.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Administrator, as chief executive officer of the U.N.T.E.A., will have full authority under the direction of the Secretary General to administer the territory for the period of the U.N.T.E.A. administration in accordance with the terms of the present agreement.

ARTICLE VI

1. The United Nations flag will be flown during the period of United Nations administration.

2. With regard to the flying of the Indonesian and Netherlands flags, it is agreed that this matter will be determined by agreement between the Secretary General and the respective governments.

ARTICLE VII

The Secretary General will provide the U.N.T.E.A. with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; such forces will primarily supplement existing Papuan police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands armed forces will be repatriated as rapidly as possible and while still in the territory will be under the authority of the U.N.T.E.A.

ARTICLE VIII

The United Nations Administrator will send periodic reports to the Secretary General on the principal aspects of the implementation of the present agreement. The Secretary General will submit full reports to Indonesia and the Netherlands and may submit, at his discretion, reports to the General Assembly or to all United Nations members.

FIRST PHASE OF UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE IX

The United Nations Administrator will replace as rapidly as possible top Netherlands officials as defined in Annex A with non-Netherlands, non-Indonesian officials during the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration, which will be completed on 1 May, 1963. The United Nations Administrator will be authorized to employ on a temporary basis all

Netherlands officials other than top Netherlands officials defined in Annex A, who wish to serve the U.N.T.E.A., in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Secretary General may specify. As many Papuans as possible will be brought into administrative and technical positions. To fill the remaining required posts, the U.N.T.E.A. will have authority to employ personnel provided by Indonesia. Salary rates prevailing in the territory will be maintained.

ARTICLE X

Immediately after the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A., the U.N.T.E.A. will widely publicize and explain the terms of the present agreement, and will inform the population concerning the transfer of administration to Indonesia and the provisions for the act of self-determination as set out in the present agreement.

ARTICLE XI

To the extent that they are consistent with the letter and spirit of the present agreement, existing laws and regulations will remain in effect. The U.N.T.E.A. will have the power to promulgate new laws and regulations or amend them within the spirit and framework of the present agreement. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the issuance of new laws and regulations or the amendment of existing laws.

SECOND PHASE

ARTICLE XII

The United Nations Administrator will have discretion to transfer all or part of the administration to Indonesia at any time after the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration. The U.N.T.E.A.'s authority will cease at the moment of transfer of full administrative control to Indonesia.

ARTICLE XIII

United Nations security forces will be replaced by Indonesian security forces after the first phase of the U.N.T.E.A. administration. All United Nations security forces will be

withdrawn upon the transfer of administration to Indonesia.

INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION

ARTICLE XIV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, Indonesian national laws and regulations will in principle be applicable in the territory, it being understood that they be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed to the inhabitants under the terms of the present agreement. New laws and regulations or amendments to the existing ones can be enacted within the spirit of the present agreement. The representative will be consulted as appropriate.

ARTICLE XV

After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, the primary task of Indonesia will be further intensification of the education of the people, of the combating of illiteracy, and of the advancement of their social, cultural and economic development. Efforts also will be made in accordance with present Indonesian practice to accelerate the participation of the people in local government through periodic elections. Any aspects relating to the act of free choice will be governed by the terms of this agreement.

ARTICLE XVI

At the time of the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia a number of United Nations experts, as deemed adequate by the Secretary General after consultation with Indonesia, will be designated to remain wherever their duties require their presence. Their duties will, prior to the arrival of the United Nations representative, who will participate at the appropriate time in the arrangements for self-determination, be limited to advising on and assisting in preparations for carrying out the provisions for self-determination except in so far as Indonesia and the Secretary General may agree upon their performing other expert functions. They will be responsible to the Secretary General for the carrying out of their duties.

ARTICLE XVII

Indonesia will invite the Secretary General to appoint a representative who, together with a staff made up, *inter alia*, of experts referred to in Article XVI, will carry out the Secretary General's responsibilities to advise, assist and participate in arrangements which are the responsibility of Indonesia for the act of free choice. The Secretary General will, at the proper time, appoint the United Nations Representative in order that he and his staff may assume their duties in the territory one year prior to the date of self-determination. Such additional staff as the United Nations representative might feel necessary will be determined by the Secretary General after consultations with Indonesia. The United Nations representative and his staff will have the same freedom of movement as provided for the personnel referred to in Article XVI.

ARTICLE XVIII

Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include:

a. Consultations (Musjawarah) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.

b. The determination of the actual date of the exercise of free choice within the period established by the present agreement.

c. Formulation of the questions in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide (a) whether they wish to remain with Indonesia; or (b) whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.

d. The eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination including those resi-

dents who departed after 1945 and who return to the territory to resume residence after the termination of Netherlands administration.

ARTICLE XIX

The United Nations representative will report to the Secretary General on the arrangements arrived at for freedom of choice.

ARTICLE XX

The act of self-determination will be completed before the end of 1969.

ARTICLE XXI

1. After the exercise of the right of self-determination, Indonesia and the United Nations representative will submit final reports to the Secretary General who will report to the General Assembly on the conduct of the act of self-determination and the results thereof.

2. The parties to the present agreement will recognize and abide by the results of the act of self-determination.

RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS

ARTICLE XXII

1. The U.N.T.E.A. and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the U.N.T.E.A.

2. The U.N.T.E.A. will take over existing Netherlands commitments in respect of concessions and property rights.

3. After Indonesia has taken over the administration, it will honor those commitments which are not inconsistent with the interests and economic development of the people of the territory. A joint Indonesian-Netherlands commission will be set up after the transfer of administration to Indonesia to study the nature of the above-mentioned concessions and property rights.

4. During the period of the U.N.T.E.A. administration there will be freedom of movement for civilians of Indonesia and Netherlands nationalities to and from the territory.

ARTICLE XXIII

Vacancies in the representative councils caused by the departure of Netherlands nationals or for other reasons, will be filled as appropriate consistent with existing legislation by elections, or by appointment by the U.N.T.E.A. The representative councils will be consulted prior to the appointment of new representatives.

FINANCIAL MATTERS

ARTICLE XXIV

1. Deficits in the budget of the territory during the U.N.T.E.A. administration will be shared equally by Indonesia and the Netherlands.

2. Indonesia and the Netherlands will be consulted by the Secretary General in the preparation of the U.N.T.E.A. budget and other financial matters relating to United Nations responsibilities under the present agreement; however the Secretary General will have the final decision.

3. The parties to the present agreement will reimburse the Secretary General for all costs incurred by the United Nations under the present agreement and will make available suitable funds in advance for the discharge of the Secretary General's responsibilities. The parties to the present agreement will share on an equal basis the costs of such reimbursements and advances.

PREVIOUS TREATIES

ARTICLE XXV

The present agreement will take precedence over any previous agreement on the territory. Previous treaties and agreements regarding the territory may therefore be terminated or adjusted as necessary to conform to the terms of the present agreement.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

ARTICLE XXVI

For the purposes of the present agreement, Indonesia and the Netherlands will apply to United Nations property, funds, assets and

(Continued on page 312)

Integration in the University of Mississippi

Reprinted below are the texts of documents relating to the conflict with the State of Mississippi and Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett over the enrollment of James Meredith, a Negro, at the University of Mississippi.

On September 24, 1962, Governor Barnett issued an executive order in defiance of the federal district court's order to admit James Meredith.

GOVERNOR BARNETT'S ORDER OF DEFIANCE

Whereas, the Constitution of the United States of America provides that each state is sovereign with respect to certain rights and powers; and

Whereas, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the powers not specifically delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the several states; and

Whereas, we are now face to face with the direct usurpation of this power by the Federal Government through the legal use of judicial decree; and

Whereas, all public officials of the State of Mississippi have the legal right, obligation and duty not to acquiesce, impair, waive or surrender any of the rights of the sovereign state of Mississippi; and

Whereas, any acts upon the part of representatives of the Federal Government to arrest or fine any state official who endeavors to enforce the law of Mississippi, are illegal according to the law of the state of Mississippi, and Federal courts have likewise established ample and perfect precedence in the matter:

Now, therefore, I, Ross R. Barnett, Governor of the state of Mississippi, by the authority vested in me under the constitution and laws of the state of Mississippi, do hereby proclaim and direct that the arrest or attempts to arrest, or the fining or the attempts to fine, of any state official in the performance of his official duties, by any representative or representatives of such Federal Government

are to be summarily arrested and jailed by reason of any such illegal acts in violation of this executive order and in violation of the laws of the state of Mississippi.

Ross R. Barnett, Governor.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ORDERS BARNETT TO SHOW WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT

On September 25, 1962, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered Governor Barnett to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. This was issued at the request of the Justice Department. On September 26, the Court of Appeals, at the request of the attorneys for James H. Meredith, again ordered Barnett to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

First Order

This court having entered an order on July 28, 1962, and the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi having entered an order pursuant to the mandate of this court on September 13, 1962, requiring officials of the University of Mississippi and the members of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi to register and admit James H. Meredith as a student in the University of Mississippi, and

This court, having, on September 24, instructed Robert B. Ellis, registrar of the University of Mississippi, James Davis Williams, chancellor of the University, Arthur Beverly Lewis, dean of the College of Liberal Arts of the University, and the defendant members of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, what action they were re-

quired to take in order to comply with the order of this court, and having particularly directed Robert B. Ellis to be available at Jackson, Mississippi at the Office of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning from 1 P.M. to 6 P.M. on September 25, 1962, for the purpose of the registration of James H. Meredith and his actual admission to the university on the same basis as other students, and this court having entered a temporary restraining order at 8:30 A.M. this day restraining Ross R. Barnett from interfering with or obstructing by any means or in any manner the performance of obligations or the enjoyment of rights under this court's order of July 28, 1962, and the order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi of September 13, 1962, and

It appearing from the verified application of the United States, *amicus curiae* herein, that on the afternoon of this day Ross R. Barnett, having been served with a copy of the temporary restraining order referred to above and having actual knowledge of the terms of that order, deliberately prevented James H. Meredith from entering the office of the Board of Trustees in Jackson, Mississippi, at a time when James H. Meredith was seeking to appear before Robert B. Ellis in order to register as a student in the university, and that by such conduct Ross R. Barnett did willfully interfere with and obstruct James H. Meredith in the enjoyment of his rights under this court's order of July 28, 1962, and did willfully interfere with and obstruct Robert B. Ellis in the performance of his obligations under this court's order of July 28, 1962, all in violation of the terms of the temporary restraining order entered by the court this day.

It is ordered that Ross R. Barnett appear personally before this court on September 28, 1962, at 10 o'clock A.M. in the courtroom of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, at 600 Camp Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, to show cause, if any he has, why he should not be held in civil contempt of the temporary restraining order en-

tered by the court this day.

The marshal is directed to serve a copy of this order upon Ross R. Barnett, forthwith.

Signed this September 25, 1962, at 8:20 o'clock P.M.

Second Order

Appellant has moved this court for an order directing Ross R. Barnett, Governor of Mississippi, to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of orders issued by this court in this action. On consideration of that motion, presented [to] this court on the 26th day of September, it is now ordered:

1. That Governor Ross R. Barnett be, and is, required to show cause, if he has any, before this court in the city of New Orleans, Old Postoffice Building, on the 28th day of September, 1962, at 10 A.M. why he should not be adjudged in contempt of orders issued by this court.

2. Service of this order is to be made by the United States Marshal.

STATEMENTS BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY

On September 27, the Justice Department and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy issued statements affirming the federal government's determination to enforce federal court orders.

Justice Department Statement

The marshals escorting James Meredith to Oxford, Mississippi have been directed to return to Memphis without attempting to enter the University of Mississippi.

This action was taken at 6:35 P.M., E.D.T., after receipt of information from Oxford that a large crowd had gathered and that the force accompanying Mr. Meredith might not be sufficient to accomplish its mission without major violence and bloodshed for the citizens of Mississippi.

Several hundred additional United States marshals are proceeding to Memphis to augment the small force which has been there since last week.

Robert Kennedy's Statement

It has been clear from the time of the court's decision ordering the University of Mississippi to accept Mr. Meredith that there would be but one resolution to these difficulties. The orders of the Federal courts can and will be enforced. It is important to our country, however, that if possible this be accomplished without force and without civil disorder.

Every American has the duty to obey the laws and the right to expect that these laws will be enforced.

It is fundamental in our system that there be respect for the law and compliance with all laws—not just those with which we happen to agree. The course which the Governor is following is, therefore, incompatible with the principles upon which this union is based.

As the legislature of the State of Mississippi stated in solemn resolve 129 years ago:

"This state owes a duty to the union above all minor considerations. . . . The doctrine of nullification is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and in direct conflict with the welfare, safety and independence of every state in the Union; and to no one of them would its consequences be more deeply disastrous, more ruinous, than to the State of Mississippi. . . ." * * *

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE AND EXECUTIVE ORDER

On September 30, President John F. Kennedy sent a message to Governor Barnett asking him to comply with federal law. He also issued an executive order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to take all measures to enforce the federal court order for Meredith's enrollment at the University of Mississippi.

Telegram to Barnett

To preserve our constitutional system the Federal Government has an overriding responsibility to enforce the orders of the Federal courts. Those courts have ordered that James Meredith be admitted now as a student at the University of Mississippi.

Three efforts by Federal law-enforcement officials to give effect to the order have been unavailing because of your personal physical intervention and that of the Lieutenant Governor, supported by state law-enforcement officers. A fourth was called off at the last minute by the Attorney General on advice from you that extreme violence and bloodshed would otherwise result.

By view of this breakdown of law and order in Mississippi and in accordance with our two telephone conversations today, I would like to be advised at once of your response to the following questions:

First, will you take action to see that the court order is enforced and personally follow the court's direction to you?

Second, if not, will you continue to actively interfere with enforcement of the orders of the court through your own actions or through the use of state law-enforcement officials, or in any other way?

Third, will state law-enforcement officials cooperate in maintaining law and order and preventing violence in connection with Federal enforcement of the court orders? In this connection, will you at once take steps to prohibit mobs from collecting in the Oxford area during this difficult period, and will you call on the university officials to issue regulations to prevent students from participating in demonstrations or mob activity? As Governor of the State of Mississippi, will you take the responsibility for maintaining law and order in that state when the court orders are put into effect? I would like to hear from you this evening by wire.

I hope for your complete cooperation and assistance in meeting our responsibilities.

Executive Order

Whereas on September 30, 1962, I issued proclamation No. 3497 reading in part as follows:

"Whereas the Governor of the State of Mississippi and certain law-enforcement officers and other officials of that state, and other persons, individually and in unlawful assemblies, combinations and conspiracies, have

been and are willfully opposing and obstructing the enforcement of orders entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; and

Whereas such unlawful assemblies, combinations and conspiracies oppose and obstruct the execution of the laws of the United States, impede the course of justice under those laws in the State of Mississippi by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; and

Whereas I have expressly called the attention of the Governor of Mississippi to the perilous situation that exists and to his duties in the premises, and have requested, but have not received from him, adequate assurances that the orders of the courts of the United States will be obeyed and that law and order will be maintained":

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the authority invested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly Sections 332, 333, and 334 thereof, do command all persons engaged in such obstructions of justice to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith; and

Whereas the commands contained in that proclamation have not been obeyed and obstruction of enforcement of those court orders still exists and threatens to continue:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10, particularly Sections 332, 333, and 334 thereof, and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to enforce all orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to remove all obstructions of justice in the State of Mississippi.

Section 2. In furtherance of the enforcement of the aforementioned orders of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the armed forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

Section 3. I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense to call into the active military service of the United States, as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, any or all of the units of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard of the State of Mississippi to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the units, and members thereof, ordered into the active military service of the United States pursuant to this section.

Section 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred upon him by this order.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

On September 30, the President addressed the nation and appealed to the citizens of Mississippi to comply with federal law:

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

The orders of the court in the case of *Meredith v. Fair* are beginning to be carried out.

Mr. James Meredith is now in residence on the campus of the University of Mississippi. This has been accomplished thus far without the use of the National Guard or other troops, and it is to be hoped that the law-enforcement officers of the State of Mississippi and the Federal marshals will continue to be sufficient in the future.

All students, members of the faculty and public officials in both Mississippi and the nation will be able, it is hoped, to return to their normal activities with full confidence in the integrity of American law.

This is as it should be, for our nation is founded on the principle that observance of the law is the eternal safeguard of liberty and

defiance of the law is the surest road to tyranny.

The law which we obey includes the final rulings of the courts as well as the enactments of our legislative bodies. Even among law-abiding men few laws are universally loved.

But they are uniformly respected and not resisted.

Americans are free, in short, to disagree with the law but not to disobey it. For in a government of laws and not of men, no man, however prominent or powerful, and no mob, however unruly or boisterous, is entitled to defy a court of law.

If this country should ever reach the point where any man or group of men, by force or threat of force could long deny the commands of our courts and our Constitution, then no law would stand free from doubt, no judge would be sure of his writ and no citizen would be safe from his neighbors.

In this case in which the United States Government was not until recently involved, Mr. Meredith brought a private suit in Federal Court against those who were excluding him from the university. A series of Federal Courts, all the way to the Supreme Court, repeatedly ordered Mr. Meredith's admission to the university.

When those orders were defied and those who sought to implement them threatened with arrest and violence, the United States Court of Appeals, consisting of Chief Tuttle of Georgia, Judge Hutcheson of Texas, Judge Rives of Alabama, Judge Jones of Florida, Judge Brown of Texas, Judge Wisdom of Louisiana, Judge Gerwin of Alabama and Judge Bell of Georgia, made clear the fact that the enforcement of its order had become an obligation of the United States Government.

Even though this government had not originally been a party to the case, my responsibility as President was therefore inescapable. I accept it.

My obligation under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States was and is to implement the orders of the courts with whatever means are necessary and with as little force and civil disorder as the circumstances permit.

It was for this reason that I federalized the Mississippi National Guard as the most appropriate instrument, should any be needed to preserve law and order while United States marshals carried out the orders of the court and prepared to back them up with whatever other civil or military enforcement might have been required.

I deeply regret the fact that any action by the executive branch was necessary in this case. But all other avenues and alternatives, including persuasion and conciliation, had been tried and exhausted.

Had the police powers of Mississippi been used to support the orders of the court instead of deliberately and unlawfully blocking them; had the University of Mississippi fulfilled its standard of excellence by quietly admitting this applicant in conformity with what so many other Southern state universities have done for so many years, a peaceable and sensible solution would have been possible without any federal intervention.

This nation is proud of the many instances in which governors, educators, and everyday citizens from the South have shown to the world the gains that can be made by persuasion and good will in a society ruled by law.

Specifically, I would like to take this occasion to express the thanks of this nation to the Southerners who have contributed to the progress of our democratic development in the entrance of students regardless of race to such great institutions as the state-supported universities of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas and Kentucky.

I recognize that the present period of transition and adjustment in our nation's Southland is a hard one for many people.

Neither Mississippi nor any other Southern state deserves to be charged with all the accumulated wrongs of the last 100 years of race relations. To the extent that there has been failure, the responsibility for that failure must be shared by us all, by every state, by every citizen.

Mississippi and her university, moreover, are noted for their courage, for their contribution of talent and thought to the affairs of

(Continued on page 313)

WEST NEW GUINEA

Continued from p. 306

officials the provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In particular, the United Nations Administrator, appointed pursuant to Article IV, and the United Nations Representative, appointed pursuant to Article XVII, will enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Section 19 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

RATIFICATION

ARTICLE XXVII

1. The present agreement will be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the contracting parties.

2. The instruments of ratification will be exchanged as soon as possible at the headquarters of the United Nations by the accredited representatives of the contracting parties.

3. The Secretary General will draw up a proces-verbal of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and will furnish a certified copy thereof to each contracting party.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

ARTICLE XXVIII

1. The present agreement will enter into force upon the date of the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution referred to in Article 1 of the present agreement.

2. Upon the entry into force of the present agreement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will register it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter.

AUTHENTIC TEXT

ARTICLE XXIX

The authentic text of the present agreement is drawn up in the English language. Translations in the Indonesian and Netherlands languages will be exchanged between the contracting parties.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York, on this fifteenth day of

August, 1962, in three identical copies, of which one shall be deposited with the Secretary-General and one shall be furnished to the Government of each of the contracting parties.

SUBANDRIO,

For the Republic of Indonesia

J. HERMAN VAN ROIJEN,

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands

C. W. A. SCHURMANN,

For the Kingdom of the Netherlands

INDONESIA

Continued from p. 277

umph," President Sukarno admitted that in the recent past 75 per cent of the national energy had had to be devoted to the reestablishment of internal security and to the solution of the West Irian problem. He acknowledged that "the food and clothing problem has not yet been carried out in a satisfactory manner." The President emphasized that one of the main stumbling blocks to the country's economic progress is fear of leftist policies, to which he refers as "communism phobia." The tone of his speech strongly hints that he will favor somewhat a leftist economic policy in the period ahead.

With the signing of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands on August 15 a whole chapter of Indonesian history since the very beginning of the struggle for independence was closed. This period was one in which her whole attitude, behavior and development was dominated by the nationalistic legacy of an uncompleted revolution, and all other problems were subordinated to it. Now that the revolution is completed, Indonesia will have to show whether she is capable of mature political behavior, industriousness towards economic development and responsibility as a member of the world community of nations.

MALAYSIA

Continued from p. 282

sul-general in Hong Kong, who was backed by a British businessman, Alfred Dent. In

1877, he obtained from the Sultan of Brunei the rights to the northwestern coast. In January, 1878, he went on to Sulu and in return for an annual payment of \$5000 secured the Sultan's cession of the northeastern coast. Just six months later the Sultan of Sulu accepted Spanish suzerainty. In 1881 Dent, who had bought out von Overbeck's rights, formed the British North Borneo Company, which was given under Royal Charter the power to govern this area. In 1885, Spain formally gave up any claims in Borneo which she might have inherited from the Sultan of Sulu, and in 1888 North Borneo was declared a British protectorate.

Before the war North Borneo was the beautiful and quiet backwater so charmingly described by Agnes Keith in her book *Land Below the Wind*. The Chartered Company continued to exercise its ruling powers until the Japanese invasion, being the last such body to do so in the British Empire. It never made more than the most modest profits and its methods were as paternal as those of the Brookes. In 1946, North Borneo became a colony under direct rule. Two-thirds of the 450,000 inhabitants are aboriginal tribes, of which the Dusuns are the most important.

PROSPECTS FOR 1963

The commission headed by Lord Cobbold which was sent to try to sound opinion on the merger in Borneo has now reported that, as far as it was able to ascertain, two-thirds of the people in each territory are in favor, though half of these are anxious for special safeguards. The other third is composed of those who want independence first and those who would be happy to continue under British rule for a time.

There are two obstacles that could cause delay. One is the Philippine claim to part of North Borneo. It is hard to take this very seriously, and it is unlikely that the Manila government will wish to disrupt its very close and cordial relations with Malaya.

² The plebiscite was held in Singapore on August 31, 1962, and resulted in a majority for merger on the terms negotiated between the Singapore and Malayan governments.

The other is the plebiscite to be held in Singapore.² Here the pro-Communist elements will put up a very bitter fight. The importance which the Communists attach to this issue can be judged by the strength of the propaganda attack which they have mounted all over the world. To combat this Lee Kuan Yew has made visits to Burma, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia recently on his way to London. It will need all his persuasiveness to carry the plan at the polls in Singapore, and so save this bastion of the security of Southeast Asia.

INTEGRATION

Continued from p. 311

this nation. This is the state of Lucius Lemar and many others who have placed the national good ahead of sectional interests. * * *

I close therefore with this appeal to the students of the university—the people who are most concerned:

You have a great tradition to uphold: a tradition of honor and courage, won on the field of battle and on the gridiron, as well as the university campus.

You have a new opportunity to show that you are men of patriotism and integrity. For the most effective means of upholding the law is not the state policemen, or the marshals, or the National Guard. It is you.

It lies in your courage to accept those laws with which you disagree as well as those with which you agree.

The eyes of the nation and all the world are upon you and upon all of us. And the honor of your university—and state—are in the balance.

I am certain the great majority of the students will uphold that honor.

There is, in short, no reason why the books on this case cannot now be quickly and quietly closed in the manner directed by the court.

Let us preserve both the law and the peace and then, healing those wounds that are within, we can turn to the greater crises that are without and stand united as one people in our pledge to man's freedom.

Thank you, and good night.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of September, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

African-Malagasy Union

Sept. 11—Gabon President Léon Mba is elected president of the African-Malagasy Union.

Sept. 13—Three days of talks among representatives of the 12 member nations end in agreement to support U.N. policies in the Congo.

Arab League

Sept. 15—The Council of the Arab League unanimously re-elects Egyptian Abdel Khalik Hassouna as Secretary General for a third five year term.

Berlin Crisis

Sept. 2—The three Allied Commanders in West Berlin issue instructions to the Soviet military leaders in charge that Soviet relief guards for the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin must refrain from using the Friedrichstrasse crossing but must use one of 2 other crossing points much closer to the memorial.

Sept. 4—Soviet relief guards for the Soviet war memorial in the British sector cross at the Sandkrug Bridge following Allied instructions.

Sept. 11—In a strong statement reaffirming its determination to press for a German peace treaty and the removal of Allied occupation troops from West Berlin, the Soviet government declares that it is willing to postpone negotiations until after the congressional elections in the U.S. in November.

Sept. 14—The Russians return to using buses to transport relief guards to the war memorial in the British sector of Berlin. Since August 20, they have used armored con-

voys because of stonings by West Berliners.

Sept. 17—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) rejects Allied protests against the Soviet abolition of the office of the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin.

Sept. 24—For the second time within a week, Soviet officers delay a U.S. army troop convoy en route from East Germany to West Berlin.

Sept. 25—It is reported that 2 Soviet planes have harassed a U.S. plane flying over one of the 3 Allied air corridors into West Berlin.

Sept. 27—At the U.N., the Earl of Home, British Foreign Secretary, urges U.N. members to call on the Soviet Union to refrain from "artificially creating crises in Berlin. . . ."

Disarmament

Sept. 5—The U.S.S.R. agrees to a U.S. suggestion that direct negotiations for a nuclear test ban continue during the recess of the disarmament conference.

Sept. 7—Recessing until November 12, the representatives at the 17-nation disarmament conference report "no progress" to the U.N. General Assembly.

International Finance

(See also *British Commonwealth, Great Britain*, Sept. 19.)

Sept. 17—The annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank opens in Washington.

United Nations

Sept. 3—Acting Secretary General U Thant issues his annual report; he opposes any changes in the U.N.'s voting system.

Sept. 5—\$86 billion in cash and commodities for a cooperative battle against hunger is

pledged by 31 nations to the World Food Program.

Sept. 18—In its opening session, the General Assembly votes to admit Rwanda, Burundi, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago as members; there are now 108 united nations.

Pakistani Muhammad Zafrulla Khan is named president of the General Assembly.

Sept. 21—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko tells the U.N. that a United States attack on Cuba will lead to war.

The General Assembly approves the agreement under which Indonesia will administer Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian). (For the text of this agreement, see p. 303 *ff.* of this issue.)

ALGERIA

Sept. 3—Troops loyal to Vice Premier Ahmed Ben Bella and the Political Bureau are ordered to take Algiers "at any price" as fighting continues with the opposition Willaya (military zone) 4.

Sept. 5—A cease-fire between the Political Bureau and Willaya 4 leaders is announced.

Clashes between Ben Bella's forces and those of Willaya 4 continue.

Sept. 13—A new list of candidates for election to the first National Assembly is published; ex-Premier Ben Khedda and 52 others have been removed from the single slate of candidates.

Sept. 20—Algerian voters cast their ballots for members of the National Assembly.

Sept. 25—The newly elected National Assembly meets and elects Ferhat Abbas as speaker.

Sept. 26—The National Assembly votes to ask Ahmed Ben Bella to form a government.

Sept. 29—The National Assembly votes approval of Ben Bella's 18-member Cabinet.

ARGENTINA

Sept. 6—Agreeing to the demands of the 3 military secretaries, President José María Guido dissolves the rump Congress; he also signs a decree scheduling presidential and congressional elections for October 27, 1963.

Sept. 18—The Cavalry Corps and Campo de

Mayo troops (largest military garrison) rebel against the army high command after War Secretary General Jose-Octavio Cornejo Saravia dismisses 3 army generals.

Sept. 20—Government forces clash with rebel Campo de Mayo garrison troops about 40 miles outside Buenos Aires.

Sept. 21—President Guido broadcasts an order that the warring military factions must return to their quarters. He announces that he has accepted the resignations of Saravia and army commander in chief, General Juan Carlos Lorio.

Sept. 23—The rebels are victorious. The army chief of staff and the army commander in chief are under arrest. President Guido promises to hold elections as soon as possible. Brigadier General Juan Carlos Onganía, leader of the Nationalists (rebels), also promises early elections.

BOLIVIA

Sept. 3—Bolivia withdraws from the activities of the O.A.S. temporarily until the O.A.S. takes action to end the 23-year old fight with Chile over the use of the waters of the Lauca River.

BRAZIL

Sept. 13—Premier Francisco Brochado da Rocha and his Cabinet resign; the Cabinet refused the Premier's request for Cabinet approval to seek a vote of confidence in Congress on a national plebiscite to choose between a presidential or parliamentary form of government.

Sept. 15—The Chamber of Deputies approves the Senate bill for a plebiscite on January 6, 1963.

Sept. 17—President João Goulart names Hermes Lima, former Labor Minister, as premier.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

Sept. 20—Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan accompanies Prime Minister John Diefenbaker on his return to Canada from the Prime Ministers' Conference in London.

Ghana

- Sept. 3—Krobo Edusei returns to the Cabinet as Minister of Agriculture; he was dismissed in April, 1962, when his wife was criticized for the purchase of a \$9,000 bed.
- Sept. 11—The National Assembly approves the one-party system for Ghana.
- Sept. 13—The National Assembly amends the criminal code to allow the detention of suspects for 28 days instead of the customary 24 hours.
- Sept. 22—President Kwame Nkrumah declares a state of emergency in Accra and Tema, because of continuing terrorism.
- Sept. 27—Army reinforcements arrive in Accra in search of terrorists; 15 persons have died and 250 have been wounded in the last 7 weeks.
- Sept. 28—After expelling two British newsmen, the Government orders censorship on all press dispatches leaving the country.

Great Britain

- Sept. 11—Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada express opposition to British membership in the Common Market, at the 15-nation Commonwealth conference.
- Sept. 12—The Prime Ministers of Nigeria and Tanganyika oppose British membership in the Common Market.
- Sept. 19—In a closing communiqué, the Commonwealth prime ministers agree that the decision on joining the Common Market must be made by Britain alone; they express hope that Commonwealth ties will not be weakened.

At the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling proposes a "mutual currency account" to the world's finance ministers.

India

- Sept. 10—A final report on the 1961 census reveals a population increase of 21.5 per cent in the last 10 years; the present population is reported at 439,235,000.
- Sept. 20—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

begins a 3-day official visit in Paris.

Sept. 21—India announces qualified agreement to begin discussions in Peking in October on the border dispute with Communist China.

Nigeria

- Sept. 22—Opposition leader Obafemi Awolowo is placed under house arrest; no explanation is offered.

Pakistan

- Sept. 15—President Mohammad Ayub Khan confers with French President Charles de Gaulle after the close of the London Prime Ministers' conference. (See also *United States, Foreign Policy*.)

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Aden

- Sept. 24—The Legislative Council begins discussion of Britain's suggestion that Aden join the South Arabia Federation; protesting rioters fight police and British troops.

Singapore

- Sept. 2—It is reported that unofficial estimates of yesterday's referendum reveal overwhelming support for Singapore's merger with the Federation of Malaya.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

- Sept. 9—The U.S. State Department announces that a U-2 plane missing over the China mainland is one of two bought by Nationalist China from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in a "direct sale."
- Sept. 10—The Chinese Communist government charges that it has shot down the missing Nationalist Chinese U-2. It accuses the U.S. of spying.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

(See *China, People's Republic of*.)

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

- Sept. 3—President Moise Tshombe of secessionist Katanga Province announces his approval of the U.N. plan for uniting the

Congo "as the basis of an acceptable settlement. . . ."

Sept. 6—In a note to U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant, the Soviet Union proposes a plan for ending Katanga's secession. The U.S.S.R. suggests that all U.N. members end relations with Katanga secessionists and that all foreign personnel be expelled.

Sept. 12—Two Katanga soldiers are killed in a clash with U.N. forces after the U.N. ordered the removal of a Katanganese roadblock on the road from Kishwishi to Elisabethville.

Sept. 13—Tshombe accuses the U.N. of sending 2,000 Congolese troops into Katanga to attack his province.

CUBA

Sept. 2—A communiqué made public in Moscow announces that increased Soviet military aid and military instructors will be sent to Cuba. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 8—U.S. sources report that Soviet military advisers and personnel have been observed in the region of the U.S. base at Guantanamo.

Sept. 11—Soviet Premier Khrushchev warns that nuclear war may break out if the U.S. attacks Cuba. He declares that Russian arms are being sent to Cuba "exclusively for defensive purposes." (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Sept. 13.)

Sept. 12—A Cuban Air Force instructor, who defected to the U.S. last week, reports that the Soviet Union has given Cuba over 200 MIG jet fighter planes.

Sept. 25—Premier Fidel Castro announces that the Soviet Union and Cuba will construct a Cuban port to serve both Cuban and Soviet fishing vessels. In Havana, Castro and the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on the Fishing Industry, Aleksandr A. Ishkov, earlier today signed the fishing port treaty.

DENMARK

Sept. 3—Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag is named premier to succeed the ailing Viggo Kampmann.

FRANCE

Sept. 4—President Charles de Gaulle arrives in Bonn for a 6-day visit of state.

Sept. 20—De Gaulle, in a radio and television broadcast, tells the French people of his plan to hold a national referendum to amend the constitution to provide for direct election of the president by universal suffrage.

Sept. 29—King Olav V of Norway ends a 4-day visit to France. Norwegian Minister Halvard M. Lange, before departing, issues a statement criticizing French determination to build its own nuclear striking force.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Sept. 7—In Hamburg, French President de Gaulle calls for "organic cooperation" between the French and West German armies.

HAITI

Sept. 17—It is reported that at the closing of the legislature on September 15, the members voted to give President Francois Duvalier complete control over the economy.

INDONESIA

Sept. 1—Indonesia's parliament unanimously votes approval of the Dutch-Indonesian accord on the transfer of control of West New Guinea to Indonesia, signed August 15.

Sept. 7—The Netherlands' House of Representatives approves the Dutch-Indonesian agreement.

Sept. 13—The Senate approves the Dutch-Indonesian pact on West New Guinea's future. (For the text of this agreement, see pp. 303 ff.)

KOREA, SOUTH

Sept. 6—Officers of the U.N. Command declare that North and South Korean troops fired on one another last night along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. Three North Korean soldiers are killed.

Sept. 27—Ex-Premier John M. Chang, leader of South Korea's last elected government

and deposed in May, 1961, is sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. On trial since August 20, Chang is charged with assisting a plot to overthrow General Chung Hee Park, leader of the ruling military junta.

LAOS

Sept. 17—The first group of American military personnel leaves, as provided in the Geneva agreement to establish a neutral Laos.

NETHERLANDS, THE

(See *Indonesia*.)

PORTUGAL

Angola

Sept. 25—It is announced that General Venancio Deslandes has been dismissed as governor-general of Angola.

SWEDEN

Sept. 16—Elections for provincial, city and local councils are held. The 25 provincial councils and 4 large city councils elect half of the upper house of parliament.

Sept. 17—Election returns reveal that Premier Tage Erlander's Social Democratic party has polled more votes than ever before, 51 per cent. Mail votes are not yet counted.

SYRIA

Sept. 12—Syrian-Israeli troops clash twice. Cease-fire agreements are negotiated by U.N. observers.

Sept. 14—The Syrian Assembly names Khaled el-Azm premier.

Sept. 20—Premier el-Azm and his Cabinet dissolve parliament. The Cabinet will rule by decree until new elections are held within the year.

U.S.S.R., THE

Sept. 2—The Soviet Union announces an agreement has been made to supply military arms and military instructors to Cuba. (See also *Cuba*.)

Sept. 4—The U.S.S.R. delivers a note to the U.S. charging that a U-2 reconnaissance plane made a "provocative flight" 5 days

ago over Sakhalin Island. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Sept. 4-5.)

Sept. 5—The chairmen of the House and Senate Space Committee in the U.S. release a letter from the head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, James E. Webb, in which he lists 6 unsuccessful Soviet attempts to send space probes to Mars and Venus.

Sept. 7—The Soviet Union reports a reduction planned for its armed forces in 1963.

Sept. 8—The U.S. A.E.C. reports that the Soviet Union has tested a nuclear device in the megaton range over its test site in the Arctic.

Sept. 11—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) issues a government statement warning that any U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships headed for Cuba would lead to war.

Sept. 15—The U.S. Justice Department reveals that it has obtained evidence to prove that 2 Soviet employees at the U.N. were carrying on "illegitimate intelligence activities." The 2 Russians left the U.S. during the summer.

Sept. 24—The government announces that a scheduled income tax reduction, part of the program for gradual abolition of the income tax, has been postponed because of world tensions and the need to maintain economic growth.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Sept. 24—President Gamal Abdel Nasser broadcasts that the government has been reorganized along "group leadership" lines. He names Aly Sabry premier.

Sept. 28—Nasser names a 12-member Presidential Council to reorganize the government.

Sept. 29—Nasser names a new Cabinet to serve under Premier Aly Sabry.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Sept. 1—The National Farmers Organization begins a campaign to withhold shipments of cattle, hogs, sheep and grain until long-term contracts with processors guarantee higher prices.

Sept. 25—Voting 52-41, the Senate gives final approval to a farm bill authorizing a direct government subsidy of 18¢ a bushel for wheat and livestock feed grains. The government is authorized also to pay farmers to let their land lie idle and to help such farmers use the idle acreage for recreation and conservation. A 10-year pilot program for using idle farmland is also authorized. The bill goes to the White House.

Foreign Policy

Sept. 4—President Kennedy pledges the U.S. to use "whatever means may be necessary" to stop Cuban aggression in this hemisphere.

A State Department note says that a U.S. U-2 plane may have "unintentionally" flown over Soviet territory.

Sept. 5—The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* rejects the U.S. explanation of the alleged U-2 flight over Sakhalin.

Sept. 7—Vice-President Lyndon Johnson returns from a 17-day trip to Italy, Greece and the Middle East.

Sept. 13—In a news conference, Kennedy says military action now against Cuba is neither required nor justified.

Sept. 21—Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric reveals that West Germany, France and Italy have agreed to purchase U.S. arms; this will offset U.S. gold losses abroad.

Sept. 24—Kennedy and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan reaffirm their alliance and discuss Pakistani problems in Newport, Rhode Island.

September 26—The State Department reveals that the U.S. will sell short-range defensive missiles to Israel.

Sept. 28—Returning from a trip to West Germany, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara says the U.S. will use nuclear arms to protect vital interests in Berlin.

The U.S. charges that two Soviet delegates to the U.N. are spies.

Sept. 30—The Earl of Home, British Foreign Secretary, and President Kennedy discuss the Cuban situation.

It is reported that Kennedy has received a private invitation from Soviet Premier Khrushchev to visit the U.S.S.R.

Government

Sept. 6—The Tariff Commission refuses to place a special extra duty on cotton goods imports to offset the foreigners' advantage gained through the U.S. 2-price system.

Sept. 7—The President asks Congress for the power to call 150,000 members of the Ready Reserves for a year of active duty.

Sept. 11—Robert Soblen, convicted U.S. spy, dies in London.

Sept. 14—The President signs into law a bill authorizing \$900 million for public works projects in economically depressed areas.

Sept. 22—Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., is named Ambassador at Large.

Sept. 24—Congress sends the President a bill giving him the special limited reserve mobilization powers he has requested; he can call 150,000 ready reservists to active duty and extend active duty tours.

Sept. 26—President Kennedy signs a bill setting up a health program for migratory farm workers.

The President signs a bill authorizing construction of an atomic power plant to be built by the Washington Public Power supply system at Hanford, Washington.

Sept. 28—Kennedy names Kathryn E. Granahan, Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania, as Treasurer of the United States, succeeding Elizabeth Smith Gatov.

Military Policy

Sept. 4—California Institute of Technology scientists reveal that Mariner II, the spacecraft bound for Venus, has been successfully directed by radio to change its course; the Mariner II is now expected to pass 9,000 miles from Venus and observe Venus by instrument.

Sept. 10—The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense reveal that atmospheric nuclear testing will be resumed in the Johnston Island area; the high altitude nuclear explosion of July 9 created an unexpectedly intense and durable radi-

ation belt that is forcing revision of the space program and the nuclear testing schedule.

Politics

Sept. 13—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower opens his 1962 electioneering campaign supporting Republicans for the coming elections.

Sept. 18—President Kennedy's brother Edward wins an overwhelming victory in the Massachusetts Democratic primary for the U.S. Senate.

Sept. 20—President Kennedy opens his 1962 electioneering campaign asking for a "progressive Congress."

Segregation

Sept. 4—In New Orleans, Roman Catholic schools open on an integrated basis.

Sept. 10—Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court rules that the University of Mississippi must admit a Negro this fall.

Sept. 27—After three futile attempts to register Negro James Meredith at the University of Mississippi, the Justice Department gives up its fourth attempt to avoid "major violence and bloodshed." The state of Mississippi has forcibly prevented Meredith's registration in defiance of federal authority.

Sept. 28—The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit finds Mississippi Governor Ross R. Barnett guilty of civil contempt of the federal court order against interference with the admission of a Negro to the University of Mississippi.

Sept. 29—Mississippi's Lieutenant Governor, Paul Johnson, is found guilty of contempt of the federal court order.

Sept. 30—President Kennedy issues a proclamation ordering insurgents in Mississippi to cease and desist from obstructing justice; he orders the National Guard in Mississippi into active federal military service.

Meredith is placed in residence at the University of Mississippi under federal marshal escort; Governor Barnett says Mississippi has been "physically overpowered" by the federal government; he will

continue the struggle in the courts. Rioting and shooting begin; federal troops move into Oxford, Mississippi.

Kennedy, on television, appeals to the people of Mississippi and the students at the University of Mississippi to comply with the law as interpreted by federal courts.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Sept. 12—On a visit to South Vietnam, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor receives reports on the training of Vietnamese troops by U.S. Special Forces.

Sept. 18—Government troops clash with Viet Cong (pro-Communist) rebels at An Hu in the Plain of Reeds. Some 153 Viet Cong are reported dead.

YEMEN

Sept. 19—Imam Ahmad, the ruler of Yemen, dies. Crown Prince Saif al-Islam Mohammed al-Badr is named his successor.

Sept. 27—Radio broadcasts from Yemen report that a coup d'état has been staged by rebellious military troops, and that the new Imam Ahmad has been assassinated.

Sept. 28—A radio broadcast from Sana reports that the revolutionary command is in complete control. Ten government leaders have been executed. Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal has been named commander in chief and premier.

Sept. 30—Foreign Minister of the newly established Free Yemeni Republic Mohsen el-Ainy declares that the new regime is "firmly" in control.

YUGOSLAVIA

Sept. 19—The draft of the new Yugoslav constitution, providing for a premier and cabinet with President Tito retaining his power and position, is published.

Sept. 20—The draft constitution is presented to the parliament.

Sept. 24—Soviet titular head of state Leonid I. Brezhnev arrives in Belgrade for an official visit. Brezhnev declares that he hopes his visit will further Yugoslav-Soviet friendship.

ISSUES BELOW ARE AVAILABLE FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE
INDICATE IN PROPER SPACE THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE WANTED

Current Issues

- ☐ Africa: A New Nationalism (10/61)
- ☐ The Soviet Union: Programs and Policies (11/61)
- ☐ Asia and Southeast Asia (12/61)
- ☐ Middle East in Perspective (4/62)
- ☐ Disarmament and Coexistence (5/62)
- ☐ U.S. Trade in Perspective (6/62)
- ☐ U.S. Trade Policy, 1962 (8/62)
- ☐ China (9/62)
- ☐ Russia (10/62)
- ☐ Asia, South and Southeast (11/62)

Coming Soon

- ☐ Africa South of Sahara (12/62)
- ☐ North Africa (1/63)
- ☐ Latin America (2/63)
- ☐ India (3/63)
- ☐ Divided Germany (4/63)
- ☐ East Europe (5/63)

Still Available

- ☐ American Economy (7/60)
- ☐ American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- ☐ Canada (7/55)
- ☐ Government and Education Abroad (6/61)
- ☐ Government and Education in the U.S. (7/61)
- ☐ Government and Labor in the U.S. (9/59)
- ☐ Mediterranean World (8/55)
- ☐ Problems of American Education (8/61)
- ☐ Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- ☐ Public Power in the U.S. (5/58)
- ☐ Tensions in East Central Europe (4/59)
- ☐ U.S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)
- ☐ World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)
- ☐ World of Islam (6/57)

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 year, \$7.50; 2 years, \$14; 9 months, \$5.85.

NINE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$5.85; 5 or more, \$4.95 per sub.; 10 or more, \$4.50 per sub.; 30 or more, \$4.05 per sub.; 50 or more, \$3.60 per sub.

TWELVE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$7.50; 5 or more, \$6.60 per sub.; 10 or more, \$6.00 per sub.; 30 or more, \$5.40 per sub.; 50 or more, \$4.80 per sub.

RATES FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE: 1 copy of a single issue, 85¢ per copy; 5 or more copies of different issues, 65¢ per copy; 5 or more of the same issue, 55¢ per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 50¢ per copy; 30 or more of the same issue, 45¢ per copy; 100 or more of the same issue, 35¢ per copy.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Pa.

- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Please send me group subscriptions for ☐ 9 months; or ☐ 12 months.
- ☐ 1 year, \$7.50 plus 3 free issues as marked above. ☐ 2 years, \$14 plus 3 free issues as marked above.
- ☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me.

MR. }
MISS }
MRS. }
ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ ZONE _____ STATE _____

These offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

11-62-3

KEEP UP-TO-DATE

SOME OF THE THINGS CURRENT *History* OFFERS YOU

★ AREA STUDIES . . . Month after Month, our area studies will keep you informed and round out your background information on vital topics.

| | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| CHINA (Sept., '62) | NORTH AFRICA (Jan., '63) |
| RUSSIA (Oct., '62) | LATIN AMERICA (Feb. '63) |
| ASIA (Nov., '62) | INDIA (Mar., '63) |
| AFRICA SOUTH (Dec., '62) | DIVIDED GERMANY (Apr., '63) |
| | EAST EUROPE (May, '63) |

Subscribe now to CURRENT HISTORY. Exclusive and Original Studies will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy.

Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. CURRENT HISTORY's continuing reference volumes are one-of-a-kind.

COORDINATED AREA STUDIES contain seven or eight articles each month devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, background, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspects of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of today's world.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW . . . offers a day-by-day chronological account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

AREA MAPS help you follow the text.

DOCUMENTS . . . Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOKS REVIEWS . . . Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the social science field.

A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS

With your subscription you will receive three free issues. Today your need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundredfold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to CURRENT HISTORY will include three coordinated studies FREE — chosen from our List of Available Issues (see reverse side) — plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your three free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover.

← **PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR FULL DETAILS**